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Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, 
Free Speech, and Cyberspace 
Edward Stein* 
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus 
exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and of the 
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals 
from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand 
of an intolerant society. 1 
Pseudonymity allows people who are experimenting with different 
sorts of interests to do so without social repercussions. People can 
temporarily obscure their real life and play with a different con-
ception of what their life might be. 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The expansion of cyberspace in the past decade has created unprece-
dented opportunities for communication, both across the globe and 
across the street. The Internet and other forms of cyberspace have pro-
vided new avenues for anonymous and pseudonymous communication. 
Individuals can now interact without the traditional constraints of time, 
place, and manner of communication. 
As the number of people using cyberspace and the ways they can use 
it have dramatically increased, governments have attempted to regulate 
speech in cyberspace through various means. In the United States, the 
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Ph.D., Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology; J.D. , Yale Law School; B.A., Williams College. Thanks to 
James Boyle, William Eskridge, Owen Fiss, Katherine Franke, Janet Halley, Elizabeth 
Hillman, Morris Kaplan, Jerry Kang, Daphne Keller, Steve Lin, Stephen Munzer, William 
Rubenstein, Rose Saxe, and Kenji Yoshino for provocative conversations, helpful sugges-
tions, and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. This Article was completed while I 
was on leave from Cardozo working as a law clerk for the Honorable Judge Dolores 
Sloviter of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge Sloviter and my 
co-clerks, Forrest Alogna and Dahlia Fetouh, provided a supportive, engaging, enriching, 
and collegial work environment. Versions of this Article were presented at UCLA Law 
School, Rutgers-Camden Law School, and the Law, Culture and Humanities Conference 
held in March 2002 at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm' n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citation omitted). 
2 Ben Greenman, Liar Liar, YAHOO! INTERNET LIFE, Mar. 1999, at 89, 91 (quoting 
Professor Jerry Kang, UCLA Law School). 
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most notable examples are the Communications Decency Act (CDA),3 
the Children 's Online Protection Act (COPA),4 and the Children's Inter-
net Protection Act (CIPA). 5 Several states have also passed laws or insti-
tuted policies that seek to regulate speech in cyberspace,6 and further 
governmental efforts to do so can be expected.7 
3 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(e) (2000). Subsections (a)(l)(B), (b), and (d)(l)-(2) of the stat-
ute were held unconstitutional by ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), aff 'g 929 F. Supp. 
824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("ACLU v. Reno I") . 
4 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000). A preliminary injunction against enforcement of thi s section 
was granted by a district court. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
("ACLU v. Reno II"). Although the district court's decision was upheld by the Third Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court, though refusing to decide whether the statute might be unconsti-
tutional on other grounds, overruled the Third Circuit's limited grounds for affirming the 
unconstitutionality of this section and remanded to that court for further proceedings. See 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1713-14 (2002), vacating ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 
162 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court did not, however, vacate the district court's preliminary 
injunction, and the federal government remains enjoined from enforcing the statute during 
the pendency of the Third Circuit's further proceedings. Id. 
5 20 U.S.C. § 9 I 34(f) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2000). Pursuant to a provision in 
the Children's Online Protection Act allowing for immediate review of the constitutionality 
of the Act by a three-judge panel, followed by direct appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court, a three-judge panel found these sections unconstitutional as a violation of the First 
Amendment; the Supreme Court 's review of that decision is pending. Am. Library Ass ' n v. 
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob. juris. noted, 2002 WL 31060372 
(U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361 ). 
• See, e.g., GA . CODE ANN. § 16-9-93. l(a) ( 1999) (prohibiting the use of a computer to 
fa lsely identify the user) (law preliminarily enjoined on free speech grounds, ACLU v. 
Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N. D. Ga. 1997)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.675 (West 
1993 & Supp. 2002) (banning distribution of sexually explicit material to minors over the 
Internet) (state preliminarily enjoined from enforcement on First Amendment and Com-
merce Clause grounds, Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 
(E. D. Mich. 1999), aff'd, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000)) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) 
(Michie Supp. 2002) (prohibiting dissemination by computer of materi al that is harmful to 
a minor) (preliminary injunction against enforcement of statute on First Amendment and 
Commerce Clause grounds upheld, ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 ( I 0th Cir. 1999), 
aff 'g 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M . 1998)); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235 .21(3) (McKinney 2000) 
(prohibiting intentionally engaging in communication with a minor that "depicts actual or 
simulated nudity [or] sexual conduct ... and which is harmful to minors") (law prelimi-
narily enjoined on Commerce Clause grounds, Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); VA . CODE ANN. § 2.2-2827 (Michie 2001) (recodification of VA. 
CODE ANN. § 2.1-804 to -806 (Michie Supp. 2000)) (prohibiting state employees from 
accessing sexually explicit material on computers owned or leased by the state) (section 
initially held unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds but then found constitutional 
by the Fourth Circuit on appellate review, Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 
1998), rev'd en bane sub nom. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S . 1070 (2001)); VA . CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Michie Supp. 2002) (prohib-
iting intentional display of sexually explicit material to minors for commercial purposes) 
(permanently enjoined on First Amendment and Commerce Clause grounds, PSINet, Inc . 
v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Va. 2001)); see also Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. 
of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding a li-
brary's policy requiring the use of filtering software on computers available for public 
access to be unconstitutional). 
1 See, e.g., Assemb. B. 151 , 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 200 I) (proposing state law 
similar to CIPA); S.B. 3414, 224th Ann. Legi s. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (proposing a prohibition 
on using library computers to access obscene material or child pornography) ; H.B. 8, 
124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001), enacted as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
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This Article focuses on a community that is particularly affected by 
the regulation of speech in cyberspace,8 namely lesbians, gay men, and 
other sexual minorities.9 It argues that protecting the speech of lesbians, 
gay men and other sexual minorities is at the heart of the First Amend-
ment and that attempts to regulate such speech should be closely scruti-
nized. This Article suggests that the regulation of speech in cyberspace 
uniquely impacts lesbian and gay speech and concludes that such regula-
tion should be subject to close judicial scrutiny. 
Given the pervasive effects of regulation on the lesbian and gay 
community, it is unsurprising that among the litigants challenging almost 
every attempt to regulate speech in cyberspace in the United States have 
been lesbians and gay men, the businesses that serve them, or the organi-
zations that represent their interests. Among those challenging the CDA 
in ACLU v. Reno I were the Queer Resources Directory, an online re-
source for lesbians, gay men and other sexual minorities, and an AIDS 
education group that maintains a Web site. 10 Among those challenging 
COPA in ACLU v. Reno II were A Different Light Bookstore, a gay and 
lesbian bookstore that maintains a Web site, Blackstripe, a Web-based 
resource for African American lesbians and gay men, Philadelphia Gay 
News, a newspaper serving the lesbian and gay community that also pub-
lishes online, and Planet Out, an online content provider serving the les-
§ 2907.0l(J) (West, WESTLAW through Oct. I, 2002, including File 185 of 125th Gen. 
Assemb. (2001-2002)) (expanding the definition of material in sex offense laws to include, 
inter alia, any image appearing on a computer monitor, recorded on a computer disk, or 
transmitted using the Internet) . 
8 Legal scholars have examined the effects of cyberspace on women and racial minori-
ties. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace , 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175 
(2000); Margaret Chon, Erasing Race ?: A Critical Race Feminist View of Internet ldentity-
Shifting, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 439 (2000); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. I 130 (2000). Somewhat related to some of the themes discussed herein is Seth F. 
Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment in 
the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 130 (2001). 
9 In addition to particularly affecting lesbians and gay men, the regulation of speech in 
cyberspace will also have distinctive impact on bisexuals, transgendered people (people 
whose sex and sexual identity are discordant), and intersexuals (people who have some 
male and some female physical/anatomical characteristics). See EDWARD STEIN, THE Mis-
MEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 24-38 
(1999) (discussing the differences among sexual minorities). See generally BERNICE L. 
HAUSMAN, CHANGING SEX: TRANSSEXUALISM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE IDEA OF GENDER 
(1995); SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE lNTERSEXED (1998); Kenji Yoshino, The 
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000). In this Article I 
focus for the most part on lesbians and gay men but will often use the phrase "lesbians, 
gay men, and other sexual minorities" to encompass these other groups of people. Typi-
cally, even when I use the more restrictive phrase, I mean to include sexual minorities 
generally. For reasons discussed infra note 123, I do not include people who engage in sex 
between adults and children. Whether and to what extent other sexual minorities, such as 
people who engage in sadomasochistic sex, are similarly situated to lesbians and gay men 
is a question beyond the scope of this Article. 
10 See ACLU v. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff 'd, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). See generally Queer Resources Directory, at http://www.qrd.org (last visited Nov. 
9, 2002); Critical Path Project, at http://www.critpath.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) . 
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bian and gay community. 11 Among those challenging CIPA in American 
Library Ass'n v. United States are Planet Out, Out in America, a com-
pany that runs over sixty Web sites for lesbians, gay men and other sex-
ual minorities, and a young lesbian who accesses the Internet from a 
public library. 12 The same pattern emerges among many of the challenges 
to state laws and policies. 13 
Attempts to regulate cyberspace are of special concern to sexual mi-
norities. Many lesbians and gay men find cyberspace to be an important 
source of information, a useful way of community and political organiz-
ing, a congenial and entertaining way of spending time, and a potential 
medium for meeting friends, lovers, and sexual partners. 14 For those who 
are isolated from other lesbians and gay men in the "real" (that is, physi-
cal, non-cyber) world, cyberspace provides a virtual community that con-
stitutes an emotional lifeline. The relative anonymity of cyberspace is 
ideal for lesbians and gay men who are not open about their sexual ori-
entation and for people who are exploring their sexuality. Cyberspace 
provides opportunities for which lesbians and gay men as a group, more 
11 See ACLU v. Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 485, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (for this case's 
complicated procedural history, see supra note 4). See generally A Different Light Book-
store, at http://www.adlbooks.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002); Blackstripe, at http://www. 
blackstripe.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002); PHILA. GAY NEWS, at http://www.epgn.com 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2002); Planet Out, at http://www.planetout.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). 
12 See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415-16 (E.D. Pa. 
2002), prob. juris. noted, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361). 
13 See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611,613 (W.D. Va. 2000) (list-
ing as among the plaintiffs A Different Light Bookstore and the Lambda Rising Bookstore, 
both gay and lesbian bookstores that have maintained or do maintain Web sites, and Susie 
Bright, a columnist who writes about lesbian sex and other gay issues and maintains a Web 
site at http://www.susiebright.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002)); Cyberspace Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (listing as among the 
plaintiffs GLAD Day Bookshop, a store specializing in lesbian and gay books, with a Web 
site at http://www.gladdaybookshop.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002), and the AIDS Partner-
ship of Michigan, which had maintained a Web site), aff'd, 238 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 2000); 
ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (D.N.M . 1998) (noting that among the activi-
ties in which the plaintiffs engage is providing online resources for lesbian and gay youth), 
aff'd, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 635 (E.D. Va. 
1998) (listing as among the plaintiffs Professor Heller, who conducted research on lesbian 
and gay studies using a state university's computer), rev 'd en bane sub nom. Urofsky v. 
Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001); Mainstream 
Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d. 552, 557 (E.D. Va. 
1998) (listing as among the plaintiffs Books for Gay and Lesbian Teens/Youth, which 
maintains a Web site at http://www.youth.org/yao/docs/books.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002), 
and The Renaissance Transgender Association, the Web address of which is http://www. 
ren.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2002)); ACLU v. Miller, No. 96-cv-2475-MHS, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1446, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 1997) (listing as among the plaintiffs Atlanta 
Veterans Alliance, a group for gay veterans); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 
160, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (listing as among the plaintiffs New York City Net, a for-profit 
Internet service provider catering primarily to lesbians and gay men in the New York area). 
14 See JEFF DAWSON, GAY AND LESBIAN ONLINE: YOUR INDISPENSABLE GUIDE TO 
CRUISING THE QUEER WEB (4th ed. 2000); Jennifer Egan, Lonely Gay Teen Seeking Same, 
N .Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 110; Steve Friess, Cyber Activism, Aovo-
CATE, Mar. 2, 1999, at 35. 
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than heterosexuals as a group, have a particular need. This Article there-
fore focuses on the intersection of the First Amendment, cyberspace, and 
the social and legal circumstances of lesbians and gay men. 
Laws that restrict the expression of lesbians and gay men in cyber-
space disrupt one of the central functions of the First Amendment, 
namely "to protect . . . unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . and 
their ideas from suppression."15 While all non-dominant groups, includ-
ing women and racial minorities, are affected by attempts to regulate cy-
berspace, 16 restrictions on anonymity uniquely affect "closeted" lesbians, 
gay men, and other sexual minorities. When governments regulate cyber-
space, th~ must consider the impact of potential legislation on lesbians 
and gay men and safeguard against the suppression of unpopular groups 
and ideas; when courts evaluate these regulations, they should subject efforts 
to limit the speech of lesbians and gay men to close judicial scrutiny. 
My discussion will proceed as follows. In Part II, I discuss cyber-
space and attempts to regulate it. In Part III, I survey the social and legal 
conditions for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in the United States and 
look at how these conditions are manifest in cyberspace. In Part IV, I ex-
plore the ways in which courts have dealt with the speech of sexual mi-
norities. While I show that since the middle of the twentieth century, 
speech concerning homosexuality and the speech of lesbians and gay 
men have, for the most part, been protected by the First Amendment, I 
focus on the exceptions to this protection. In Part V, I discuss anonymous 
speech. In particular, I examine the Supreme Court's holding that the 
protection of at least some anonymous speech is an important part of the 
right to free speech. In Part VI, drawing on the three preceding Parts, I 
argue that the First Amendment fundamentally protects lesbians and gay 
men who speak "from the closet," that is, who speak anonymously or 
pseudonymously. In Part VII, I argue that when lesbians and gay men 
speak openly rather than from the closet, their speech is political and 
thus also central to the First Amendment. In Part VIII, I apply the con-
clusions of the two preceding Parts to cyberspace and suggest that the 
speech of lesbians and gay men in cyberspace, whether anonymous or 
not, deserves special protection. I demonstrate how these conclusions 
build upon judicial responses to governmental attempts to regulate cyber-
space. I argue that restrictions on the speech of lesbians and gay men, 
particularly in cyberspace, undermine the First Amendment and should 
therefore be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 
15 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comrn' n, 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995). 
16 See, e.g., supra note 8. 
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II. CYBERSPACE AND ATTEMPTS To REGULATE IT 
A. Cyberspace Defined 
[Vol. 38 
"Cyberspace" is a catchall phrase for computer-mediated communi-
cation; it is the "location" of various electronic interactions. Cyberspace 
includes communication on and through the Internet, the World Wide 
Web, electronic mail, Usenet discussion groups, chat rooms, the ex-
change of digitized images, video, and sounds, as well as other modes of 
communication. In cyberspace, individuals can, inter alia, shop, bank, 
conduct research, make friends, keep in touch with family, and engage in 
political activism. The possibilities for communication in cyberspace are 
expanding rapidly.17 
Those who have reservations about speaking openly can participate 
in almost all of the activities in cyberspace anonymously or pseudony-
mously. 18 A user of cyberspace can adopt a pseudonym and decline to 
"attach" any information (or at least any true information) about her-
self-such as her name, hometown, race, or sexual interests-to this 
pseudonym. It is usually possible for the state or a motivated, cyber-
savvy individual to locate the person behind the pseudonym. There are, 
however, various privacy tools that make such tracing difficult. 19 
B. Attempts To Regulate Cyb.ff)-space 
Faced with growing numbers of cyberspace services and users, Con-
gress has attempted to limit certain types of communication in cyber-
space. In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA). In general, this Act sought to protect minors from indecent and 
patently offensive communications in cyberspace by prohibiting anyone 
from sending or displaying indecent or obscene messages to people under 
the age of eighteen.20 In ACLU v. Reno/, the Supreme Court struck down 
17 For a canonical judicial discussion of cyberspace, see ACLU v. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 
824, 830-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (containing extensive findings of fact concerning the nature 
of cyberspace), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844, 849-57 (1997) (containing a summary of same). 
18 Pseudonyrnity allows an individual to use a name other than her own in cyberspace. 
This provides limited anonymity because pseudonyms can typically be traced back to the 
user (with varying degrees of difficulty). Something closer to complete anonymity can be 
provided through various technological means, including so-called anonymous remailers. 
See Noah Levine, Note, Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous Communication 
in Cyberspace, 96 CoLUM. L. REY. 1526, 1528 n.9 (1996). Henceforth, I use the word 
"anonymity" to encompass pseudonymity. 
19 See, e.g., Anonyrnizer.com, at http://www.anonymizer.com (providing access to 
downloadable software, including a version that is free of charge, that allows users to send 
e-mail, post messages, and access Web sites anonymously-that is, without allowing for 
the possibility that the activities can be traced back to the user); see also Shawn C. Helms, 
Translating Privacy Values with Technology , 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH . L. 288, 316 (2001), 
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/volume7/Helms.pdf. 
20 The statute reads in part: 
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the CDA on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment protection 
of speech.21 The Court held that the CDA was overly broad because it 
unduly restricted adult access in order to protect children22 and because it 
regulated "indecent" speech protected by the First Amendment along 
with obscene speech,23 which is not protected by the First Amendment.24 
Further, the Court held that the CDA violated the First Amendment be-
cause, although the government's interest in protecting children is com-
pelling, there are less restrictive ways of attempting to protect children 
than those adopted by the CDA. 25 
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision in ACLU v. 
Reno I with the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). This Act prohibited 
the following conduct: 
Whoever knowingly in interstate or foreign commerce by 
means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for 
commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that in-
cludes material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more 
than $50,000, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.26 
COPA defines material harmful to minors as: 
(a) Whoever (l) in interstate or foreign communications ... (B) by means of a 
telecommunications device knowingly (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates 
the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other 
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the 
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such 
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; ... (2) knowingly 
permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any ac-
tivity prohibited by paragraph (I) with the intent that it be used for such activity, 
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both . . .. 
(d) Whoever (I) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly (A) uses an 
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years 
of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner avail-
able to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, pro-
posal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in 
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sex-
ual or excretory activities or oljgans, regardless of whether the user of such service 
placed the call or initiated the-' communication; or (2) knowingly permits any tele-
communications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity 
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall 
be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (2000). 
21 See ACLU v. Reno I, 521 U.S. 544, 870 (1997). 
22 Id. at 874-75. 
23 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (defining obscenity as explicitly 
sexual speech that primarily appeals to prurient interest in sex, that is offensive to commu-
nity standards, and that lacks serious literary, scientific, artistic, or political value). 
24 ACLU v. Reno I, 521 U.S. at 871. 
25 Id. at 878-79. 
26 47 u.s.c. § 231 (2000). 
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[A]ny communication, picture, image, graphic image file, arti-
cle, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is ob-
scene or that (A) the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole 
and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is de-
signed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, 
or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to mi-
nors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an ac-
tual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhi-
bition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value for minors.27 
Various plaintiffs filed suit to prevent the enforcement of COPA, arguing 
that the statute was unconstitutional. The district court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of COPA on the grounds that 
it violated the First Amendment,28 finding that COPA imposed a 
significant burden on the speech of people who make use of cyberspace 
and that it failed to use the least restrictive means for doing so. The Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the statute 
was overbroad insofar as it gauged harm to minors by contemporary 
community standards. 29 
In a highly fractured opinion, the Supreme Court vacated that deci-
sion and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. Justice Thomas ' 
opinion, only part of which commanded a five-judge majority, focused on 
the "narrow question [of] whether [COPA's] use of 'community stan-
dards' to identify 'material that is harmful to minors' violates the First 
21 Id. § 23 l(e)(6) . 
28 ACLU v. Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
29 ACLU v. Reno II, 217 F.3d 162, 173- 74 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002). The Third Circuit explicitly did not reach 
other issues addressed by the district court below: 
[W]e do not find it necessary to address the District Court 's analysis of the 
definition of "commercial purposes" ; whether the breadth of the forms of content 
covered by COPA could have been more narrowly tailored; whether the 
affirmative defenses impose too great' a burden on web publishers or whether 
those affirmative defenses should have been included as elements of the crime it-
self; whether COPA's inclusion of criminal as well as civil penalties was exces-
sive; whether COPA is designed to include communications made in chat rooms, 
discussion groups and links to other websites; whether the government is entitled 
to so restrict communications when children will continue to be able to access 
foreign websites and other sources of material that is harmful to them; what taken 
"as a whole" should mean in the context of the web and the Internet; or whether 
the statute's failure to distinguish between material that is harmful to a six year 
old versus a sixteen year old is problematic. 
Id. at 174 n. 19. On remand, the Third Circuit will undoubtedly address these issues. 
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Amendment."30 The Court found that COPA's use of community stan-
dards did not render it facially unconstitutional and remanded the case 
for further constitutional analysis of COPA. While eight of the justices 
concurred in the result, only two judges joined Justice Thomas in the 
most substantive sections of his opinion.31 
Because of the fractured nature of the Court's decision and the nar-
rowness of its holding, it is difficult to discern what the Court will do if, 
as seems likely, the Third Circuit, on remand, holds that COPA is uncon-
stitutional on other grounds. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion sug-
gests that he and Justices Souter and Ginsburg have serious doubts about 
COPA's constitutionality.32 Justice Stevens, who dissented, would have 
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Justices Breyer and 
O'Connor are likely to be the swing votes when, as seems inevitable, 
COPA again reaches the Supreme Court. Their separate concurrences, both 
of which focus on the constitutionality of a national standard for obscen-
ity, do not provide much indication of their views on COPA as a whole. 33 
Various states have passed laws like the CDA or COPA. For exam-
ple, in 1999, Michigan passed a law that banned the distribution of sexu-
ally explicit material to minors over the Internet.34 In Cyberspace Com-
munications, Inc. v. Engler, this law was preliminarily enjoined against 
enforcement on the basis that it likely violated the First Amendment and 
the Commerce Clause.35 Other such state laws have been enjoined on 
similar grounds.36 
C. Filtering 
Various courts, in addressing the constitutionality of the CDA, 
COPA, and similar state laws have found that the use of filtering software 
that blocks access to certain Web sites is a less restrictive means of fulfilling 
the legitimate government interest in preventing children from accessing 
30 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1703 (2002). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Scalia joined the entirety of Justice Thomas's opinion. Justice O'Connor joined parts I, 
II, and IV, as well as part lll-B. Justice Breyer joined parts I, II, and IV. 
31 See id. at 1708-13 (Part III, sections A, B, and D, of Justice Thomas's opinion were 
joined only by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia); id. at 1714 (O' Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1715 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); id. at 1716 (Kennedy, J ., joined by Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). 
32 /d. at 1716 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("There is a very real likeli-
hood that [COPA] is overbroad and cannot survive [a facial] challenge."); id. at 1722 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Court of Appeals[ ' ] .. . ultimate conclu-
sion may prove correct. There may be grave doubts that COPA is consistent with the First 
Amendment."). 
33 See id. at 1715 (O' Connor, J ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 1716 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
34 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.675 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002). 
35 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999), ajf'd, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000). 
36 See supra note 6. 
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obscene and indecent material in cyberspace. 37 Such software allows in-
dividual parents to control their children's access to cyberspace. The 
virtue of such software is that when parents are in control, the state need 
neither restrict speech in cyberspace nor restrict access to cyberspace. 
There are various types of filtering methods, of which the two most 
frequently used are keyword blocking filters and site-blocking filters. The 
less sophisticated type of filters search for certain undesirable ("dirty") 
keywords or phrases and then remove these words or phrases from the 
page or, alternatively, block pages containing such words. Such keyword 
filters are unsophisticated because they unintentionally block out many 
sites . For example, a filter that attempts to prevent access to sexually ex-
plicit Web sites by screening out the word "sex" would also screen out 
Web pages with information about sextuplets and musical sextets, as well 
as sexual orientation and perhaps even the Mars Explorer (in which the 
letters "s," "e," and "x" are adjacent).38 
More sophisticated are programs that use site-blocking filters ( or 
programs that combine such filters with "dirty word" blocking filters). 
These types of filtering programs maintain lists of Web sites and either 
(a) prohibit access to all the sites on the list ("black-list" filters) or 
(b) permit access to only those sites on the list ("white-list" filters). 
While each method faces serious limitations,39 white-list filters (like that 
used by AOL in its "Young Teen" area40) provide greater assurance that 
the filtered sites will be free of offending material, because each site has 
been screened and then specifically included on the list of accessible 
sites. However, these filtering methods are limited in that they only pro-
vide access to specified sites. New Web pages that have not yet been 
scrutinized will also be blocked. 
37 See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno I, 521 U.S . 844, 877 ( 1997). 
38 An early version of the filtering program CYBERsitter did not actually block access to a 
Web page because the page contained a prohibited word; rather, it displayed the page, but 
ommitted the word. Because this version of the program included "homosexual" among its 
"dirty words," a Web page that contained the sentence "The Catholic Church opposes homo-
sexual marriage" would be rendered by CYBERsitter as "The Catholic Church opposes mar-
riage." Peacefire, CYBERsitter Examined, at http://peacefire.org/censorware/CYBERsitter (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2002); see also GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, ACCESS 
DENIED VERSION 2.0: THE CONTINUING THREAT AGAINST INTERNET ACCESS AND PRIVACY 
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 17 (Dec. 
1999), available at http://www.glaad.org/org/binary-data/GLAAD_PDF/pdf_file/2.pdf [herein-
after ACCESS DENIED]. 
39 For a detailed general discussion of the limitations of filtering software, see Ameri-
can library Ass 'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428-50 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob. 
juris. noted, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361). 
40 Digital Chaperones for Kids , CONSUMER REP., Mar. 2001, at 20 [hereinafter Digital 
Chaperones]. A similar filtering method was used in I 996 by a library in Westerville, 
Ohio. Computers in the children's section of the library were restricted to a few thousand 
sites chosen by librarians. After three years, the library stopped using this system because 
it dramatically constrained the material children could access in cyberspace. See Am. li-
brary Ass 'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25. 
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Both white-list and black-list filters must be constructed and main-
tained through human intervention. Because of the size of the Web and 
the difficulties involved in rating each Web site and keeping the ratings 
up-to-date, neither type of filter will be effective. White-list filters require 
frequent maintenance to ensure that sites that were originally approved 
do not add offending content; otherwise, they will fail to provide the 
pristine content they purport to deliver. A huge staff would be necessary 
to evaluate even a significant portion of existing Web sites to determine 
which ones should be filtered. Even if such a staff could be assembled, 
the people who do the screening would have to make subjective determi-
nations about each site they screen. To do their job properly, the screen-
ers would have to assess whether each site's content is appropriate for 
different age groups and in light of varied filtering criteria. A site-
blocking program that uses a black-list filter will probably not screen out 
most offensive content. For example, in an independent study, the 
filtering program Cybersnoop failed to block ninety percent of objection-
able sites.41 Additionally, most site-blocking software blocks access to 
some lesbian and gay material, much of which is clearly not offensive.42 
Many states and the Federal government have turned to filtering 
software, despite its limitations, in light of the negative judicial assess-
ment of CDA, COPA and similar statutes. For example, the public li-
braries in Loudoun County, Virginia, as part of providing Internet access 
to its patrons, installed such a program (a filtering program called X-
STOP) on its public terminals. The library's policy for Internet access 
provided, in part, that: 
all library computers would be equipped with site-blocking 
software to block all sites displaying ... child pornography and 
obscene material; and ... material deemed harmful to juveniles; 
... all library computers would be installed near or in full view 
of library staff; [and that] ... patrons would not be permitted to 
access pornography .... 43 
A nonprofit organization, several county residents, and two Web pages 
directed at sexual minorities filed suit in federal court challenging the 
library's Internet policy, arguing that it violated their free speech rights. 
41 Digital Chaperones, supra note 40. 
42 See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 445-47 (listing several Web sites 
with gay and lesbian content in its discussion of erroneously blocked Web sites); ACCESS 
DENIED, supra note 38; Lisa Guernsey, Sticks and Stones Can Hurt, but Bad Words Pay, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at Gl (discussing filtering software and mentioning one widely 
used program that prohibits access to any site that uses the phrase "gay rights"); see also 
Digital Chaperones, supra note 40 (noting that some filters are likely to curb access to 
Web sites that discuss political and social issues). 
43 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d, 
552, 556 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
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The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the library's 
Internet access policy violated the First Amendment because, in part, it 
restricted the access of adult patrons in order to protect minors and be-
cause it was neither necessary for nor narrowly tailored to any compel-
ling state interest.44 
The decision in Mainstream Loudoun did not discourage Congress 
from passing a law requiring use of filtering software. In 2000, Congress 
passed the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"),45 which requires 
public schools and libraries to install filtering software that prohibits ac-
cess to obscene material, child pornography, or material that is harmful 
to minors, in order to be eligible for certain federal funding.46 Library or 
school personnel may disable the filtering software for certain adult users 
who can demonstrate that they are engaged in a "bona fide research pro-
gram"47 that requires unfiltered access to cyberspace, but neither provi-
sion defines a bona fide research program or says how library or school 
personnel can make the necessary assessments of the proposed research 
and do so in a way that protects users' privacy. 
A three-judge panel recently found CIPA unconstitutional, applying 
strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on library patrons' access to 
cyberspace.48 The court held that the mandatory use of filtering software 
is not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.49 
Specifically, the court found that the filtering software, because of its 
technological limitations, "block[s] access to substantial amounts of con-
stitutionally protected speech."5° Further, the court found that while li-
braries do allow access to blocked sites when a library patron requests, 
this method of dealing with the technological limitations of filtering pro-
grams "will deter many patrons because they are embarrassed, or desire 
to protect their privacy or remain anonymous."51 The fact that libraries 
will disable filtering on request does not, according to the court, "cure 
the constitutional deficiencies in public libraries' use of Internet filters."52 
44 Id. at 570. 
45 Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified in various scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code.) 
46 Specifically, one portion of CIPA requires public libraries that receive federal funds 
through a program designed to provide access to information services such as the Internet 
to install filtering technology to prohibit access to obscene material, child pornography 
and, if the computers involved are used by minors, material that is harmful to minors. 47 
U.S.C. § 254 (2000). Another portion requires libraries that receive funding for computer 
equipment or Internet access from the Library Services and Technology Act to take similar 
measures. 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000). 
47 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) (2000). 
48 Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 453-70 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(discussing the level of scrutiny applicable to library use of filtering software), prob. juris. 
noted, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361). 
49 Id. at 470-84 (applying strict scrutiny). 
so Id. at 410. 
51 Id. at 411. 
s2 1d. 
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The court concluded that CIPA was facially invalid on First Amendment 
grounds and enjoined its enforcement. 
Ill. THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 
AND ITS LEGAL ENFORCEMENT 
As background for the discussion of the impact on sexual minorities 
of attempts to regulate cyberspace, I consider some features of the social 
situation of lesbians, gay men and other sexual minorities in the United 
States and their legal enforcement. In the United States, lesbians and gay 
men face a hostile social environment. Although it seems beyond dispute, 
Justice Scalia has sought to deny this reality, claiming that homosexuals 
have both "high disposable income" and "political power much greater 
than their numbers [that] ... they devote to achieving not merely a 
grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexual-
ity."53 The following discussion endeavors to dispel skepticism like Jus-
tice Scalia's regarding the severity of anti-gay sentiment and structures in 
the United States. 
A. The Legal Situation of Lesbians and Gay Men 
One way to assess the situation of lesbians and gay men is to exam-
ine the laws that are directed at them in particular. In the United States, 
depending on how one counts, thirteen states as well as the military 
(which is a separate criminal jurisdiction) have laws that criminalize 
most forms of same-sex sexual activity. 54 Although no state regularly en-
forces these laws (called "sodomy" laws or laws regarding "unnatural" 
sex acts) when adults privately and willingly engage in such activity, in 
some states, these laws have been selectively applied to gay men and les-
bians. 55 The Supreme Court has ruled, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 56 that the 
Constitution allows states to prohibit consensual homosexual activity. 
Laws against sexual activity between people of the same sex are often 
used to support and justify other laws and social practices relating to ho-
mosexuality. 57 Criminal prohibitions relating to sexual activity between 
53 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S . 620, 645-46 ( 1996) (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
54 Of these states, three (Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma) have laws that criminalize 
certain sexual acts only when committed by two people of the same sex. See KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-3505 (1995) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (2001 ); Tux. PENAL CooE ANN. 
§ 21.06 (Vernon 1994); see also Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, State-by-State Map 
of Sodomy Laws, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/sodomy-map (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2002). 
55 See, e.g., Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 
Tux. L. REV. 813, 822 n.56 (2001) ; Christopher Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries 
Inflicted by Unenforced Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV . 103, 108 n.31 (2000). 
56 478 U.S. 186,186 (1986). 
57 For example, in Padula v. Webster, to defend a ban on lesbians and gay men working 
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation against an equal protection challenge, the D.C. 
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people of the same sex restrict sexual behaviors and enforce negative at-
titudes toward lesbians and gay men.58 
Not only is sex between people of the same sex criminalized, lesbi-
ans, gay men and bisexuals are also subject to a multitude of discrimina-
tory practices. For example, it is legal in thirty-nine states for a non-state 
entity to discriminate in hiring and housing on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.59 In many states, lesbians and gay men face difficulties (often in-
surmountable) adopting children and, in Florida, they are simply prohib-
ited as a matter of law from adopting.60 Additionally, no state provides 
lesbian and gay relationships with the same legal recognition it provides 
heterosexual marriages; even Vermont, which has been the most progres-
sive state in recognizing same-sex relationships, created an independent 
category of "civil unions" rather than providing same-sex couples access 
to the institution of marriage.6 1 Moreover, same-sex couples who obtain 
civil unions in Vermont do not receive the federal benefits that accrue to 
married couples,62 and their relationship may not be recognized in other 
Circuit Court cited the Supreme Court 's decision in Bowers. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 
97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The circuit court said, " It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to 
declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving 
of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause." Id. at 103. 
58 See, e.g., Hassel, supra note 55 ; Leslie, supra note 55. 
59 See, e.g., Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471,475 n.13 (2001). Title VII does not prevent private 
employers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e. g. , Smith v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of effeminacy); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 
(6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); Ruth v. Children's Med. Ctr., No. 90-4069, 1991 WL 151158 (6th 
Cir. Aug. 8, 1991); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam). Various scholars have argued against this interpretation of Title VII. See, e.g. , 
Samuel Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Dis-
crimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. l (1992); Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) 
and Title VII, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 1158 (1991). For now, legislative change seems the most 
promising strategy for protecting against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001, H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (proposing to amend Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in most 
employment contexts). 
60 FLA. STAT. ch. 63 .042(3) (2001). This law was recently upheld against a constitu-
tional challenge in Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S .D. Fla. 2001). 
61 See, e. g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2002) ; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]. 
62 1 U.S .C. § 7 (2000) ("[T]he word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ' spouse' refers only to a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or wife."). 
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states.63 Outside Vermont, same-sex couples are denied access to the vast 
majority of the rights and privileges that marriage offers.64 
The legal asymmetries surrounding sexual orientation are not limited 
to the rights and privileges withheld from gay and lesbian individuals. 
Rather, they extend to lesbian and gay institutions and community struc-
tures. For example, various public schools have denied funding to lesbian 
and gay student organizations.65 In addition, plays, photographs, and 
other forms of artistic expression that reflect lesbian and gay culture have 
been prohibited from receiving government support.66 In fact, representa-
tions of and by lesbians and gay men have played a central role in de-
bates over government funding of the arts and public standards of "de-
cency."67 
Finally, despite the discrimination faced by lesbians and gay men, 
past and present, current Supreme Court case law does not afford sexual 
orientation heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause, as it does for classifications based on race, ethnicity, 
national origin, sex, alienage, and legitimacy.68 While the Supreme Court 
has not directly ruled on the question of whether sexual-orientation 
63 See 28 U.S.C. § l738C (2000) (providing that a state does not have to give full faith 
and credit to a same-sex marriage legally performed in another state) ; Burns v. Burns, 560 
S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a Georgia woman who obtained a civil union 
in Vermont with her same-sex partner was nevertheless bound by a court decree denying 
visitation with her children from a previous marriage while "cohabiting" with an adult to · 
whom she is neither married nor related). 
64 See, e.g .• ESKRIDGE, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 61, at 6~7. 
65 See, e. g. , E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. , 
81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (finding no violation of 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000), a 
provision of the Equal Access Act, when, in response to the formation of a gay high school 
student group, the school board barred all "non-curriculum-related" student groups); see 
also Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist. , 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting 
preliminary injunction after finding that the school board's denial of a gay group's request 
for recognition was likely a violation of the Equal Access Act); E. High Sch. Prism Club v. 
Seidel, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Utah 2000) (granting preliminary injunction on the basis 
that a gay student group was likely curriculum-related and had thus probably been improp-
erly prevented from organizing and meeting on school property). 
66 See, e.g., Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding a 
"decency" clause in the NEA's governing statute against a First Amendment challenge by 
artists, including some lesbian and gay artists). 
67 See, e.g., Nancy Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From the Well of Loneliness 
to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401 , 495-96 ("Congress and executive agencies 
have imposed conditions on state-funded speech mandating that it cannot be offensive or 
outside the bounds of 'general standards of decency.' Often, the decision to include such a 
subjective standard was intentionally designed to disqualify expressions of same-sex de-
sire."). 
68 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S . 356 (1886) (heightened scrutiny for ethnic 
classification); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (heightened scrutiny for national 
origin); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-23 (1982) (heightened scrutiny for alienage); 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (heightened scrutiny for legitimacy); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (heightened scrutiny for gender). 
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classifications deserve heightened scrutiny, most lower courts that have 
considered the question have held that they do not.69 
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans is in-
structive.70 In Romer, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colo-
rado Constitution. The amendment, which was approved by a state-wide 
voter referendum, repealed various city ordinances in Colorado that pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and, further, 
prohibited any state or local government from passing laws that would 
protect lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from such discrimination.71 The 
Court explicitly did not reach the question of whether sexual orientations 
deserve heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it held that the Colorado constitutional 
amendment failed to pass constitutional muster even under rational re-
view, a weaker standard of judicial scrutiny. Justice Kennedy wrote for 
the majority: 
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a 
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, 
an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legisla-
tion. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the rea-
69 Several cases have explicitly refused to grant heightened scrutiny for sexual orienta-
tion classifications. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(refusing to grant heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications in the context of 
the military's policy on homosexuality); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (same); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same in the 
context of the FBI); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (same in 
the context of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy). There have been rare excep-
tions to these decisions, though all have been vacated or reversed on appeal. See, e.g. , Wat-
kins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that sexual orientation 
classifications deserve heightened scrutiny and, under this standard of review, that the U.S. 
military's pre-1992 policy of discharging homosexuals was unconstitutional), withdrawn, 
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance 
Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that classifications based on homo-
sexuality or perceived homosexuality deserve heightened scrutiny under equal protection), 
rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (D. Kan. 1991) 
(same), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. 
Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of writ of 
certiorari on grounds that discrimination against homosexuals ra:ses significant equal pro-
tection concerns). 
70 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S . 620 (1996). 
71 The amendment at issue in Romer reads, in part: 
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any 
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall en-
act, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall 
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to 
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of 
discrimination. 
Cow. CoNST. art. II, § 30b. 
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sons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by 
anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a 
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.72 
175 
Some scholars have read Romer as suggesting that the Court is in 
fact applying a somewhat heightened standard of review to sexual-
orientation classifications, one either equivalent to the intermediate stan-
dard of review it applies to gender classifications,73 which is a somewhat 
less searching review than strict scrutiny,74 or a standard in between mere 
rational review and conventional intermediate scrutiny-what some have 
called "rational review with bite."75 Given the highly deferential nature of 
rational basis review, it seems clear that the Court in Romer had a more 
rigorous test in mind. Perhaps Romer indicates that heightened scrutiny 
for sexual orientation is just around the corner. In the meantime, how-
ever, various federal courts have applied rational basis review in scruti-
nizing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation. While some 
of them have invalidated sexual-orientation discrimination,76 others have 
found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is constitu-
tionally legitimate. 77 
B. Social Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
Legal matters aside, social attitudes toward lesbians and gay men 
and other sexual minorities, while improving in significant ways, remain 
predominantly negative. Violence against lesbians and gay men is not 
12 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
73 See, e.g. , Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a state law permitting 
girls to buy low-alcohol beer at a younger age than boys because it made use of sex-based 
classifications). 
74 But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (noting that the 
justification of a law that makes use of sex-based classifications must be "exceedingly 
persuasive"). 
75 See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by 
Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J . 779 ( 1987). 
76 Several federal courts have issued decisions that used the rational review standard to 
overturn laws that make use of sexual orientation classifications. See, e.g., Stemler v. City 
of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that selective prosecution based 
on sexual orientation fail s rational review); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (holding, in part, that there was no "rational basis for permitting one student to 
assault another based on the victim's sexual orientation"); Glover v. Williamsburg Local 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the decision 
not to rehire a teacher based solely on sexual orientation fails rational review); Weaver v. 
Nebo Sch. Dist. , 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that the decision not to reas-
sign a public school teacher to coach a volleyball team based on her sexual orientation fails 
rational review). 
77 See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); Beller v. Middendorf, 
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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uncommon.78 Such violence is often quite severe, as several hate-crime 
murders of gay men and lesbians in the past few years have graphically 
demonstrated.79 The prevailing intolerance toward sexual minorities 
manifests itself in low self-esteem in many lesbians and gay men, espe-
cially young ones. As striking evidence of this trend, lesbian and gay 
teenagers are two to three times more likely to attempt suicide than their 
heterosexual counterparts. 80 
While national opinion polls indicate that attitudes toward lesbians 
and gay men are becoming more favorable over time, over forty percent 
of the population still believes that homosexuality is not an acceptable 
lifestyle and that same-sex sexual relations between consenting adults 
should be illegal. 8 1 Further, over half of the population opposes laws that 
would give same-sex couples some of the legal rights of married cou-
ples. 82 A recent poll found that approximately fifty-six percent of adult 
Americans disapprove of homosexual couples adopting children.83 Vari-
ous polls have suggested that substantially more than half of adult 
Americans would be "upset" or "very upset" if their college-age child 
said he or she was gay or lesbian .84 Read together, these polls demon-
78 See, e.g., GARY DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 
(1991). 
79 See Troy A. Scotting, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal Legislation, 
34 Akron L. Rev. 853, 887-89 (2001) ; Henry F. Fradella et al., Sexual Orientation, Justice, 
and Higher Education: Student Attitudes Towards Gay Civil Rights and Hate Crimes, 11 L. 
& SEXUALITY 11 , 14 (2002). 
80 Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND TH E 
LAW 289 (William Rubenstein ed. , 1997); see also Stephen Russell & Kara Joyner, Ado-
lescent Sexual Orientation and Suicide Risk: Evidence from a National Study, 91 AM . J. 
Pua. HEALTH 1276 (2001). 
81 Frank Newport , In Depth Analyses: Homosexuality, GALLUP POLL NEWS, Sept. , 
2002, (finding that, in May 2002, 51 % of surveyed individuals said that "homosexuality 
should be considered an accepted alternative lifestyle," compared to 34% in 1982, and that 
52% said that "homosexual relations between consenting adults should . . . be legal," com-
pared to 43% in 1977), available at http://gallup.com/poll/analysis/ia0209 I I .asp. A 1998 
Gallup poll found that 59% of American adults believe "homosexual behavior is morally 
wrong." GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1998, at 89 (1999). 
This question does not seem to have been asked more recently. 
, 82 See Newport, supra note 81 (finding that 46% of those surveyed in 2001 and 5 I% of 
those surveyed in 2002 would "oppose a law that would allow homosexual couples to le-
gally form civil unions, giving them some of the legal rights of married couples"). 
83 Humphrey Taylor, Attitudes To Gays and Lesbians Have Become More Accepting, but 
Most People Still Disapprove of Single-Sex Marriages and Adoption by Same Sex Couples, 
THE HARRIS POLL #9, Feb. 9, 2000 (reporting the results of a poll of over a thousand adults 
taken in January 2000), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID= 1. 
Similarly, a 1997 poll found that 57% of Americans were opposed to allowing male couples 
to adopt children and 55% were opposed to allowing female couples to do so. Richard 
Berke, Chasing the Polls on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, § 4 (Week in Review), 
at 3. 
84 See, e.g. , Alan Yang, Attitudes Towards Homosexuality , 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 477, 
479 (1997) ("When asked how they would react if their child told them they were homo-
sexual, large, stable majorities of respondents (over two-thirds) said they would not be 
accepting and think the rel_ationship with the child would be very much strained or they 
would be ' very upset."'); Jeffrey Sch~alz, Poll Finds Even Split on Homosexuality's 
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strate that even people who are sympathetic to lesbian and gay rights and 
who do not think homosexual conduct should be illegal continue to per-
ceive homosexuality as a negative trait. In fact, many parents have taken 
extreme measures to ensure that their children do not grow up to be les-
bians or gay men.85 
C. The Closet 
There is a further, related, feature of lesbian and gay existence in the 
United States that warrants attention: lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals 
are, in a variety of ways-some subtle, some not-encouraged to keep 
their sexual orientations secret, that is, "in the closet." The closet is a 
distinctive, pervasive, and, some have argued, singular feature of lesbian 
and gay existence. 86 Its effects are easily underestimated. People remain 
in the closet who are financially and professionally secure enough to sur-
vive the negative ramifications that might follow the disclosure of their 
homosexuality. They do so despite the energy and emotional stress in-
volved in hiding an important part of their lives from family, friends, 
neighbors, and coworkers. Even when lesbians and gay men "come out," 
the closet continues to play a central role in their lives. Since in many 
contexts people are presumed to be heterosexual, the question of whom 
to tell about one's homosexuality or bisexuality continually arises. For 
example, a lesbian whose mail carrier mistakenly asks her about her 
"sister," who is in actuality her lover, will have to decide whether to 
"come out" to him. Similarly, lesbians and gay men may find themselves 
having to worry about protecting the secrets of other lesbians and gay 
men: an individual may know that her friend is a lesbian without know-
ing who else knows and whom she wants to know. Some have argued that 
being obliged by social conventions or the "unwritten rules" of the les-
bian and gay community to keep some one else's homosexuality secret is 
an assault on one's dignity as a gay man or lesbian.87 
The closet is a social creation, but it is enforced in various ways by 
laws and judicial decisions. Courts have interpreted laws to construct 
various social and legal "double binds" for sexual minorities with respect 
Cause, N.Y. DMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at Al4. Even a very recent survey of college students 
(albeit with a rather small sample size), found that 35% of those surveyed would have a 
problem with their son or daughter being gay or lesbian. See Fradella et al., supra note 79, 
at 33-34 
85 See Timothy Murphy, Redirecting Sexual Orientation: Techniques and Justifications, 
29 J. SEX RES. 501 (1992). See generally Edward Stein, Choosing the Sexual Orientation 
of Children, 12 BIOETHICS l (1998); Stein, supra note 9, at 305-27. 
86 See, e.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990). 
87 See, e.g., RICHARD MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 11-49 
(1992). See generally LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF 
OUTING (1993) (discussing the history and ethics of "outing" public figures through jour-
nalism). 
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to their identities and their expression.88 Lesbians and gay men are (im-
plicitly or explicitly) told to keep their sexual orientations secret, while, 
on the other hand, they are (implicitly or explicitly) told to confess them. 
Similarly, they are told that their identities are protected (although their 
behavior may be restricted), while conversely, they are discriminated 
against in certain contexts even when they keep quiet about their identi-
ties. 
Consider the case of Joseph Acanfora.89 Several weeks after he was 
hired as a public school teacher, school officials learned Acanfora was 
gay. Acanfora was thereafter transferred to an administrative position that 
did not involve any contact with students. After his transfer, Acanfora 
sued the school system demanding his return to the classroom. He also 
granted several television and newspaper interviews to discuss his situa-
tion. 
The trial court held that Acanfora's removal from the classroom was 
reasonable, especially in light of his interviews, which showed a lack of 
the sort of propriety teachers ought to show.90 The Court of the Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit upheld Acanfora's removal but on different 
grounds. They held that Acanfora's interviews concerned "matter[s] of 
public interest," including the difficulties that homosexuals encounter in 
families, employment, and the community at large. His speech in these 
contexts was, therefore, protected under the First Amendment and did not 
"justify . .. the action taken by the school system."9 1 The court neverthe-
less found that Acanfora's removal was justified because he lied to 
school officials by withholding the information that, in college, he had 
been involved in a "homophile" organization that "had as its purpose the 
development of public understanding about homosexuality."92 Although 
the school officials admitted that they would have refused to hire Acan-
fora on the basis of his membership in such an organization, the Fourth 
Circuit found that his failure to mention his membership in this organi-
zation disqualified him from challenging his dismissal. The trial court 
justified Acanfora's removal from the classroom because he was open 
about his homosexuality, while the appellate court justified his removal 
because he kept it secret. 
To make matters more complex, consider two other court rulings 
about homosexuality and public school teachers. In National Gay Task 
Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City,93 the Court of Appeals for 
88 SEDGWICK, supra note 86. 
89 Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974). 
90 Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843, 856-57 (D. Md. 
1973), ajf'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974). 
9
' Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500-01. 
92 Id. at 501. 
93 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided court, 470 U.S. 903 
(1985); see also Aumiller v. Univ. of Del. , 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977) (holding that 
a teacher may not be fired for speaking out on homosexuality when such speech is not 
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the Tenth Circuit held that, under Brandenburg v. Ohio,94 a teacher cannot 
be fired for advocacy of homosexual activity (for example, advocacy of 
same-sex sodomy, which was at the time illegal in Oklahoma), although a 
teacher can be fired for public homosexual activity. Contrast this holding 
with Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,95 decided by the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the same year as National Gay Task 
Force. In Rowland, a guidance counselor was suspended and subse-
quently not rehired when she told a secretary, an assistant principal, and 
several teachers that she was bisexual and involved in a relationship with 
another woman. The district court found that Rowland's firing violated 
her freedom of speech.96 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Row-
land's speech did not involve "a matter of public concern."97 According to 
the Fourth Circuit, Acanfora's homosexuality is a matter of public con-
cern; but according to the Sixth Circuit, Rowland's bisexuality is not. 
Given such a tangle of rulings, what was a gay teacher supposed to 
do after 1985? In this situation and others like it, lesbians, gay men, and 
bisexuals find themselves in a "double bind."98 Although the situation for 
lesbian and gay teachers may have improved,99 the closet has continuing 
vitality in our culture. 
For example, the current law regarding lesbians and gay men in the 
United States Armed Forces reads, in relevant part: 
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the 
armed forces . . . if one or more of the following findings is 
made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in 
such regulations: 
( 1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, 
or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless 
there are further findings ... that the member has demonstrated 
that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual 
and customary behavior; 
intended to generate publicity). 
94 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding that, under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the mere advocacy of illegal activity may not be criminalized). 
95 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984). 
96 Id. at 456-60 (appendix to appellate decision that contains the special verdicts of the 
district court). 
91 Id. at 449 . 
98 WILLIAM N . ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 
629 (1997). 
99 See, e.g., Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 
(S .D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the decision not to renew a gay teacher's contract was mo-
tivated by animus and thus violated equal protection); Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. 
Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that the removal of a lesbian volleyball coach 
based on her sexual orientation violated equal protection). 
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(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely 
to recur; 
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, 
coercion, or intimidation; 
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the 
member's continued presence in the armed forces is consistent 
with the interest of the armed forces in proper discipline, good 
order, and morale; and 
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to en-
gage in homosexual acts. 
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual 
or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further 
finding ... that the member has demonstrated that he or she is 
not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a pro-
pensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. 
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a per-
son known to be of the same biological sex. 100 
Within months of the codification of this policy, the Department of De-
fense issued various regulations for implementing this policy. 101 Accord-
ing to these regulations, the military may not ordinarily inquire into or 
investigate a service member's sexual orientation unless there is "credi-
ble information that there is a basis for a discharge.'' 102 However, if there 
is any indication of homosexual activity, or actions or speech that indi-
cate a propensity to engage in such activity, the service member may be 
discharged. Various federal appellate courts have upheld the constitution-
ality of this policy. 103 Given the relative weakness of First Amendment 
protections in the military context, military policies restricting speech of 
service members are usually upheld. 104 In particular, several courts have 
100 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000). 
101 See, e.g., Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction, 
Dep't of Def. Directive No. 1304.26 (effective Feb. 5, 1994); Enlisted Administrative 
Separations, Dep't of Def. Directive No. 1332.14 (effective Feb. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Di-
rective No. 1332.14]; Separation of Regular Commissioned Officers, Dep't of Def. Direc-
tive No. 1332.30 (effective Feb. 5, 1994). 
102 Directive No. 1332.14, supra note 101 , encl. 3, attach. 4, § I. I.I (specifying 
"Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries into Homosexual Conduct"). 
103 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Able v. 
United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 
1996); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996). 
104 Although courts widely cite Chief Justice Warren's admonition that "our citizens in 
uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian 
clothes," see, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (quoting Earl Warren, 
The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)), often they do not 
seem to heed it. For example, the Supreme Court held that the Air Force may prevent a 
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held that the restrictions on speech involved in the military's policy on 
homosexuality are justified because they are closely related to a strong 
governmental interest. 105 The military's policy concerning homosexuality 
makes the military an especially difficult environment for lesbians and 
gay men; a single utterance by a service member suggesting that he or 
she is gay or lesbian may result in his or her discharge. 106 Under this 
policy, lesbians and gay men in the military live in a legally enforced 
closet. 107 
Lest one think that the legal closet is a relic of the past or an eccen-
tricity of the military, it is worth reviewing the case of Shahar v. Bow-
ers .108 In 1990, Robin Shahar was offered a position working for the At-
torney General of the State of Georgia, Michael Bowers (of Bowers v. 
Hardwick fame). On her application for the job, Shahar listed her marital 
status as "engaged" and indicated that her future spouse was a woman. 
Before she began working, Shahar and her partner held a ceremony in 
which they exchanged vows and rings. They also openly changed their 
last names to Shahar, obtained the married rate on their insurance, and 
openly cohabited. Bowers claimed that, in light of their public ceremony, 
which Shahar herself called a wedding, he withdrew his offer of em-
ployment to Shahar because her employment would lead to public confu-
sion about the Attorney General's stand on same-sex marriage and other 
controversial issues. A divided en bane panel of the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the withdrawal of Shahar's employment 
offer was justified by Bowers' concern about public perception and the 
internal consequences of having Shahar work in his office. The Court 
service member from wearing a yarmulke while on duty and in uniform, Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), and that the Army may prohibit political speeches and 
demonstrations on base. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). For a case in which a serv-
ice member won a challenge to the military, see McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 
(D.D.C. 1998), discussed infra text accompanying notes 114-119. 
105 See, e.g. , Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928; Able, 88 F.3d at 1292. 
106 One district court permanently enjoined the military 's policy concerning homo-
sexuality as a violation of principles of free speech, arguing that the policy "burdens 
speech based solely on its content by subjecting the member to a discharge process [be-
cause of speech that states a homosexual orientation] in which the member has only at best 
a hypothetical chance to escape separation"; the Second Circuit then vacated that decision. 
Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d 
Cir. 1996). On remand, the district court again permanently enjoined the military 's policy 
as unconstitutional, this time relying primarily on equal protection grounds; however, that 
decision was also overruled by the Second Circuit. Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev 'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998). See also infra text accompanying 
notes 166-171. 
107 For useful discussions of the military 's policy, see JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A 
READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY 's ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999), Kenji Yoshino, Assimila-
tionist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don 't Ask, 
Don 't Tell," I 08 YALE L.J. 485 (I 998), and Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled 
Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1141 (1997) . 
108 114 F.3d 1097 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (en bane). 
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held that, under the Pickering balancing test, 109 Georgia's interest "as an 
employer in promoting the efficiency of the Law Department's important 
public service" outweighed Shahar's First Amendment interests. 110 If 
Bowers' rationalization is to be believed, Shahar was refused a job not 
because of her homosexuality, but for openly engaging in a same-sex 
wedding ceremony. Apparently, had Shahar remained in the closet, the 
failure to hire her would have been unconstitutional. 
D. Sexual Minorities and Cyberspace 
In light of the social and legal obstacles facing lesbians and gay men 
and, in particular, the social structure of the closet, cyberspace is an ideal 
environment and a "virtual lifeline" 111 for lesbians, gay men, and other 
sexual minorities. The following three examples illustrate this point. 
1. Emmalyn Rood 
Emmalyn Rood is a teenager who lives in Portland, Oregon. When 
she was approximately fourteen years old, Emmalyn began to think she 
might be a lesbian. Emmalyn wanted to understand various issues relat-
ing to homosexuality and her own sexual orientation. Afraid that her 
mother would discover her if she pursued this project at home, Emmalyn 
turned to her local public library. Among the resources available at this 
library were computers that provided free access to the Internet. Em-
malyn used these computers to visit Web sites providing information 
about sexuality and to take advantage of interactive modes of cyberspace 
communication, such as e-mail and chat rooms. Emmalyn was able to 
find a supportive community in cyberspace to help her embrace her own 
sexuality and, subsequently, was able to come out as a lesbian, first to 
herself and then to her family and friends . 11 2 
2. Jeffrey 
In the summer of 1999, when he was 15, ... Jeffrey . .. admit-
ted to himself that he was gay. This discovery had been coming 
on for some time; he had noticed that he felt no attraction to 
girls and that he became aroused when showering with other 
109 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (articulating a balancing test 
whereby a government employee's rights as a citizen to speak on matters of public interest 
are to be weighed against the government's interest in having employees perform public 
services). 
110 Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110. 
111 ACCESS DENIED, supra note 38, at 4. 
112 Petitioner's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 44-45, Multnomah 
County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01 - 1332 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
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boys after physical education class. But Jeffrey is a devout 
Southern Baptist, attending church several times each week, 
where, he says, the pastor seems to make a point of condemning 
homosexuality. Jeffrey knew of no homosexuals in his high 
school or in his small town in the heart of the South .... He 
prayed that his errant feelings were a phase. But as the truth 
gradually settled over him, . . . he became suicidal. . . . He 
called a crisis line for gay teenagers, where a counselor sug-
gested he attend a gay support group in a city an hour and a half 
away. But being 15, he was too young to drive and afraid to en-
list his parents' help in what would surely seem a bizarre and 
suspicious errand. 
It was around this time that Jeffrey first typed the words "gay" 
and "teen" into a search engine on [his] computer ... and was 
staggered to find himself in a teeming online gay world, replete 
with resource centers, articles, advice columns, personals, chat 
rooms, message boards, porn sites and-most crucially-thou-
sands of closeted and anxious kids like himself. That discovery 
changed his life.113 
3. Timothy McVeigh 
183 
Helen Hajne, the wife of a non-commissioned officer in the Navy, 
was organizing a toy drive for the children of members of the crew of the 
ship on which her husband was posted. She had been in contact by e-mail 
with various individuals, including Senior Chief Timothy McVeigh (no 
relation to the convicted Oklahoma City bomber) using her America On-
line (AOL) account. On September 2, 1997, she received an e-mail mes-
sage through her AOL account concerning the toy drive from 
"boysrch@aol.com" that was signed "Tim." The evocative e-mail address 
piqued her interest, so she searched for and read her correspondent's 
"member profile," an online file containing an AOL user's self-
description. According to the information in the profile, the sender of the 
message was "Tim," a person who worked in the military, lived in Ha-
waii, and who listed his marital status as "gay." The profile also listed the 
sender's hobbies as "boy watching" and "collecting pies [digitized pho-
tographs] of other young studs." Hajne passed the e-mail message and the 
profile on to her husband; eventually, this information was passed on to 
the ship's commanding officer.114 
113 Egan, supra note 14, at 110, 113. 
114 McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215,217 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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Suspecting that the sender of this e-mail was McVeigh and inferring 
that McVeigh was gay, the ship's legal advisor, a member of the Judge 
Advocate Generals' Corps, the military's "in-house" legal team, initiated 
an investigation. A Navy investigator contacted AOL through its techni-
cal services department and, without self-identifying as a member of the 
Navy or as part of an investigation of McVeigh, inquired whether the 
"boysrch" account in fact belonged to Timothy McVeigh. The customer 
service representative confirmed that it did. 
Twenty days after Hajne received the e-mail message from "Tim," 
the Navy began discharge proceedings against McVeigh under the "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell" policy 115 because of his "homosexual conduct, as evi-
denced by [his] statement that [he is] a homosexual." 116 On the ground 
that McVeigh had engaged in "homosexual conduct"-presumably, this 
"homosexual conduct" was that he identified himself as gay in his AOL 
member profile-the Navy scheduled McVeigh for discharge. 11 7 Before 
this occurred, McVeigh filed in federal court for a preliminary injunction 
to bar his discharge. The court held that the Navy had violated the mili-
tary's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy by initiating an investigation of 
McVeigh without sufficient evidence of prohibited behavior and that the 
Navy had probably also violated a provision of the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986 118 by obtaining information from an online 
service provider without following the appropriate procedures. 119 
An online news magazine for lesbians and gay men aptly described 
the importance of cyberspace as follows: 
For countless gay men and lesbians across all age groups, the 
Internet has provided a means of escape from the emotional and 
social isolation that for so many people is part of being gay. 
Deeply personal issues of sexual identity could, for the first 
time, be explored in almost total anonymity without threat of 
rejection or violence. The medium was embraced early and 
115 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2000). 
116 McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 217. 
117 /d.at215. 
118 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(l)(A)-(B), (c)(l)(A)-(D) (2000). The statute reads, in part: 
A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall 
disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of 
such service to a governmental entity only when the governmental entity (i) obtains a 
warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure or equivalent State warrant; (ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure ... ; 
(iii) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; or (iv) submits a 
formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning tele-
marketing fraud for the name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or cus-
tomer of such provider, which subscriber or customer is engaged in telemarketing. 
Id. § 2703( c )( 1 )(B ). 
119 McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 215. 
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strongly by gay people and it is widely acknowledged that gay 
men and lesbians have a presence on the Internet disproportion-
ate to their numbers. 120 
185 
Given the military 's intolerance of homosexuality, lesbians and gay men 
in the military, like McVeigh, are drawn to cyberspace as a way to ex-
press and explore their sexual orientations .121 Further, cyberspace is espe-
cially significant for gay and lesbian teenagers who, like Jeffrey and 
Emmalyn Rood (before she came out), are living with their families 
while keeping their sexual orientations a secret, and for whom physically 
entering the lesbian and gay community may be difficult. 
For homosexual teenagers with computer access, the Internet 
has, quite simply, revolutionized the experience of growing up 
gay. Isolation and shame persist among gay teenagers, of 
course, but now, along with the inhospitable families and towns 
in which many find themselves marooned, there exists a parallel 
online community-real people like them in cyberspace with 
whom they can chat, exchange messages and even engage in 
(online) sex .... What [is] most critical to ... gay kids ... [is] 
the simple, revelatory discovery that they [are] not alone. 
[G]ay teenagers surfing the Net can find Web sites packed with 
information about homosexuality and about local gay support 
groups and counseling services, along with coming-out testimo-
nials from young people around the world. Gay pornography, 
too, can be a valuable resource; [for some youths,] male and 
female ... the availability of online porn [was] critical to their 
discovery of their sexual orientation. 122 
In light of the social and legal challenges faced by lesbians, gay men 
and other sexual minorities-in particular the pervasive institution of the 
closet-cyberspace is an important refuge for many lesbians and gay 
men.123 This crucial role that cyberspace plays for many sexual minorities 
120 The Data Lounge, Internet Issues, at http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/issues/ 
index.html?storyline=286 (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). See also DAWSON, supra note 14. 
121 For a Web site devoted to lesbians and gay men in the military, see Servicemen's 
Legal Defense Network, at http://www. sldn.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). Timothy 
McVeigh's Web site can be found at http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/9241 (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2002). 
122 Egan, supra note 14, at 113. 
123 A possible concern with respect to the claims in this Part stems from a common ob-
servation among opponents of lesbian and gay rights: perhaps many of the claims I make 
about lesbians and gay men are similarly true of pedophiles; that is, pedophiles are also 
typically closeted and might find cyberspace an important refuge. This argument takes the 
form of a reductio ad absurdum: clearly the pedophile's speech in cyberspace does not 
deserve especially close scrutiny, and if the relationship of the pedophile to speech in cy-
berspace is like that of lesbians and gay men, then the speech of lesbians and gay men in 
186 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 38 
explains why lesbians, gay men, and the organizations that represent 
them are among the plaintiffs who have challenged attempts to regulate 
speech in cyberspace. In the following Part, I argue, in light of this im-
portant function of cyberspace, that attempts to regulate speech in cyber-
space should be carefully examined to ensure that they do not suppress 
the speech of sexual minorities. 
IV. FREE SPEECH AND SEXUAL MINORITIES 
A. Free Speech Generally 
The First Amendment begins, "Congress shall make no law .. . 
abridging the freedom of speech . ... " 124 Despite the simplicity and ap-
parent breadth of the protections of speech, the First Amendment is not 
absolute. The Supreme Court has recognized various exceptions to and 
limitations on the protection of speech, with respect to both type of ex-
pression (for example, obscene speech, 125 libel, 126 and the advocacy of 
violence 127) and context (for example, in certain broadcast media, 128 cer-
tain public fora, 129 and in the context of military employment130). Speech 
may be restricted when it is likely to incite imminent lawless action. 131 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that non-obscene but nonetheless 
"indecent" speech can be regulated in the context of broadcast media. 132 
The Court has essentially established a hierarchy within protected 
cyberspace also does not deserve close scrutiny. This objection does not constitute a seri-
ous challenge to the arguments advocated in this Article. The distinctive problem with a 
pedophile 's use of cyberspace is that he will use it to arrange sexual encounters with chil-
dren-encounters that are illegal and often non-consensual and, hence, immoral. See, e.g., 
Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be Shown in a Vir-
tual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (2001). A thor-
ough articulation of this false analogy between pedophiles ' speech in cyberspace and the 
speech of gay men and lesbians in cyberspace is beyond the scope of this Article. 
124 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment extends this prohibition on the abridgement of the freedom of 
speech to states as well. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. , 427 U.S. 50, 52 n. l 
(1976); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S . 88, 95 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
666 (1925). 
125 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
126 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
127 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
128 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S . 726 ( 1978). 
129 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that a government employee may 
be discharged for private speech that interferes with government services); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1981) (holding that a school may prohibit a student from 
giving a sexually explicit speech at a school assembly). 
130 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (I 986); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828 (1976). 
131 See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942). 
132 FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726. The Court specifically considered the "seven dirty 
words" listed in George Carlin's comedy routine: shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, moth-
erfucker, and ti ts. 
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speech: some speech, such as speech concerning matters of contemporary 
political concern, 133 receives very strong protection, and any attempt to 
regulate it will be strictly scrutinized; other speech, such as indecent 
speech and commercial speech, 134 may receive limited First Amendment 
protection in certain contexts. 
Constitutional theorists have offered various justifications for the 
freedom of speech. Among the most prominent are that free speech en-
courages and protects the robust public debate necessary for democ-
racy, 135 that it advances knowledge, 136 and that it promotes and ensures 
individual autonomy. 137 Various scholars have criticized each of these 
theoretical justifications. Depending on which justification for free 
speech one embraces, one might have a different account of which types 
of speech deserve First Amendment protection. The Court has not con-
sistently endorsed any single approach, and has in fact often cited multi-
ple theories in the same opinion. 
B. The Speech of Sexual Minorities 
The speech of lesbians, gay men, and other sexual minorities has re-
ceived varying treatment over the course of this century, and its status 
remains unclear today. Until 1958, speech that had a "tendency to corrupt 
morals" was deemed obscene. The decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in One, Inc. v. Olesen illustrates how courts typically 
applied the corruption-of-morals test to speech relating to homosexual-
ity.1 38 One was perhaps the first gay and lesbian magazine (although the 
publishers and readers of One would not have used that phrase to de-
scribe it). 139 A copy of an issue of One was confiscated under a statute 
prohibiting the use of the Post Office to transmit obscene publications. 140 
Applying the corruption-of-morals test, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
magazine was obscene and that the Post Office could not deliver it. In 
133 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); OWEN F1ss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE 
MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996). 
134 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc ., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment but 
that it receives somewhat weaker protection than most other types of speech). 
135 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 
133; F1ss, supra note 133. 
136 See, e.g., JottN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1989) (1859); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. , dis-
senting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) . 
137 See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Timothy Scanlon, A 
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972). 
138 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev 'd per curiam, 355 U.S . 371 (1958). 
139 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 98, at 411 . 
140 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000) (prohibiting the mailing of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of inde-
cent character"). 
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deciding to censor One, the Ninth Circuit focused in particular on a story 
describing a young woman who was coming to grips with her homosexu-
ality (the court deemed this story "cheap pornography calculated to pro-
mote lesbianism" 141 ) and a poem concerning public sex in England (the 
court considered this poem "dirty, vulgar, and offensive to the moral 
senses" 142) . Discussions and portrayals of homosexuality before 1958 in 
the United States typically received this sort of judicial treatment. 143 
In 1958, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in Olesen in a one-sentence per curiam ruling, 144 holding that the maga-
zine was not obscene under the criteria articulated in Roth v. United 
States. 145 In Roth, the Supreme Court explicitly held that obscene mate-
rial is not protected speech. The Court defined obscene material as that 
which "deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest," 146 and 
it defined "material that appeals to prurient interest" as material "having 
a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." 147 The majority went on to explain 
that "sex and obscenity are not synonymous." 148 Rather, they found that 
the First Amendment crucially protects "[t]he portrayal of sex ... in art, 
literature and scientific works." 149 The Court provided no explanation for 
its decision in Olesen, but it presumably understood the publication to 
fall within one of these categories. 
The test for obscenity developed in Roth has been modified over 
time. In Miller v. California, 150 the Court articulated the test for obscene 
speech as: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest, 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by state law, 
and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value. 151 
141 Olesen, 241 F.2d at 777. 
142 Id. 
143 See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTH EID OF 
THE CLOSET 57-97 (1999). 
144 Olesen, 355 U.S. at 371. 
145 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
146 Id. at 487. 
147 Id. at 487 n.20. 
148 Id. at 487. 
149 Id. 
150 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
151 Id. at 24 (internal citation omitted) . 
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Following this test, much speech concerning homosexuality has been 
held to be deserving of First Amendment protection. Recall, for example, 
National Gay Task Force, in which the Tenth Circuit held that a public 
employee may not be fired for advocating or promoting homosexual con-
duct.152 Similarly, in Van Ooteghem v. Gray, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that a public employee could not be fired for speaking 
publicly in favor of civil rights for lesbians and gay men. 153 
There are, however, some limitations on the protection of gay men 
and lesbians' speech that are distinct from general constraints on free 
speech. For example, in Singer v. U.S. Civil Service, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that it did not violate the First Amendment for 
a public employee to be fired for "openly and publicly flaunting his ho-
mosexual way of life." 154 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although speech 
concerning homosexuality was protected in some cases, this protection 
did not extend to "open and public flaunting or advocacy of homosexual 
conduct." 155 Although Singer was vacated by the Supreme Court after 
new Civil Service regulations were developed, 156 some courts continued 
to cite the Ninth Circuit's holding in Singer for the principle that while 
public employees may not be subject to penalties because of their homo-
sexuality, they may be penalized for being open about their homosexual-
ity.157 The more recent cases of Rowland158 and Shahar159 can be under-
stood as fitting roughly into the Singer paradigm. Neither Rowland nor 
152 Nat'I Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 
1984), affirmed by an equally divided court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). 
153 Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam). 
154 Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976) (ci-
tation omitted), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) ; see also McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 
193 (1971). 
155 Singer, 530 F.2d at 256. 
156 Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), vacating 530 
F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1971). A new personnel manual was developed on December 21, 1973, 
and new regulations became effective on July 2, 1975. Office of Personnel Management 
Civil Service Regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 731.202 (1976). The manual was modified in light of 
the decision in Society for Individual Rights v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973) 
(holding that the government must stop discharging homosexuals "solely" because the 
employment of such a person might result in public contempt of the government and 
thereby reduce confidence in government), aff'd in part, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975). On 
procedural grounds, the Ninth Circuit did not consider these changes because the new 
personnel manual was not part of the record before the district court and the new regula-
tions were adopted after the judgment of the district court. Singer, 530 F.2d at 255. The 
Supreme Court, at the suggestion of the Solicitor General, remanded the case to the Civil 
Service Commission for consideration in light of the new regulations. Ultimately, the Fed-
eral Employee Appeals Authority dismissed the case against Singer. For further discussion 
of these proceedings, see Aumiller v. Univ. of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1294 (D. Del. 
1977); Rhonda Rivera, Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 317 (1980-1981). 
157 See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980); Childers v. 
Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 141-42 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (denying a city employee 
promotional opportunities because he was not discreet about his homosexuality), aff'd, 669 
F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982). 
158 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984). 
159 Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (en bane). 
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Shahar lost her job because of sexual orientation per se. Rowland was 
fired because of her private speech (telling some of her co-workers that 
she was bisexual) . 160 Shahar was not hired because of her "expressive 
conduct" (having a public wedding with another woman).161 In a similar 
vein, the Supreme Court effectively validated the decision made by or-
ganizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston to prohibit lesbians 
and gay men from marching in the parade carrying signs identifying 
themselves as Irish lesbians and gay men. 162 
Additionally, the military 's policy concerning homosexuality 163 is 
akin to the Singer paradigm in restricting the speech of lesbians and gay 
men. There is a seemingly straightforward argument that this policy vio-
lates free speech: a service member faces strong sanctions for making a 
statement such as, "I am gay," or "I am a lesbian." Although such speech 
ostensibly does not lead automatically to the service member's discharge 
from the military, 164 it does create a strong but rebuttable presumption 
that the service member is likely to violate the law against homosexual 
conduct. 165 
District Judge Eugene Nickerson held that this aspect of the mili-
tary's policy concerning homosexuality violated the First Amendment. 166 
Nickerson noted that lesbian and gay service members who make state-
ments about their sexual orientation are making statements that deserve 
the strongest protection of the First Amendment; 167 their "coming out" 
statements constitute "important speech" because they are "expression[s] 
of personal dignity and integrity." 168 As such, the government may regu-
late such speech only if the regulation "promotes a compelling interest" 
through use of "the least restrictive means." 169 After a discussion of the 
military policy and its justifications, Nickerson concluded that "under the 
First Amendment a mere statement of homosexual orientation is not 
160 See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446. 
16 1 See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100-0 I . 
162 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
572 ( 1995) (holding that parade organizers had a free speech right not to be compelled to 
include openly lesbian and gay Irish people in their parade). For discussion of Hurley, see 
infra text accompanying notes 258-261; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommo-
dating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality , I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
85 (1998) . 
163 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) ; see also supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text. 
164 In many cases, like McVeigh's, the military violates its own policy. See McVeigh v. 
Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998) ; see also STACEY L. SOBEL ET AL. , CONDUCT UN-
BECOMING: THE SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON 'T ASK , DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE" 
(2000), available at http://www.sldn.org/templates/law/record.html?section=22&record= 
21. 
165 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). 
166 Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d 
Cir. 1996). 
167 I argue that this conclusion should be applied to lesbians and gay men in general, 
not just to gay and lesbian service members. See infra Part VII. 
168 Able, 880 F. Supp. at 973. 
169 Jd. 
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sufficient proof of intent to commit acts as to justify the initiation of dis-
charge proceedings." 170 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
overturned Nickerson's decision, 171 applying a more deferential First 
Amendment standard. Under this weaker test, the military's policy sa-
tisfied the compelling interest and least restrictive means tests .172 
In sum, although lesbians and gay men and their speech are pro-
tected by the First Amendment, courts have found that these protections 
are subject to various limitations. In particular, the social and legal con-
struct of the closet interacts with the free speech rights of lesbians and 
gay men in inconsistent ways. Although lesbians and gay men are gen-
derally free to speak about their sexual orientations, lesbian and gay 
rights, and other issues of interest and concern to them, their speech re-
mains subject to some state and social sanctions. Neither speaking as a 
gay man or lesbian nor speaking about homosexuality is without negative 
ramifications, especially in comparison to speaking about heterosexual 
relationships, heterosexual lifestyles, and heterosexual sex. 
V. ANONYMOUS SPEECH 
A. Theoretical Perspectives on Anonymous Speech 
1. Arguments in Favor of Protecting Anonymous Speech 
Perhaps the most significant argument made by both courts and 
scholars in favor of protecting anonymous speech is that anonymity con-
tributes to the type of public debate that is central to a democracy. 173 
Anonymity encourages people to freely express their views . If a person 
must identify herself in order to express an opinion, unpopular opinions 
are less likely to be expressed. The expression of a multiplicity of view-
points, especially controversial ones, is crucial to sustaining a vibrant 
democratic nation. Measures must be taken to ensure that people are 
willing to express their views, particularly with respect to matters of po-
litical controversy or of significance to the general public. The desire for 
a robust public debate on important matters of political concern supports 
the protection of anonymous speech. 
If anonymity facilitates the expression of unpopular viewpoints, it is 
possible to understand the failure to protect anonymous speech as an im-
110 Id. at 976. 
171 Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). 
172 Id. at 1296. 
173 See, e.g., Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: 
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J . 1639 (1995); Amy 
Constantine, What 's in a Name ? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An Examination 
of the Protection Afforded Free Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459 (1996) ; Lee Tien, Who's 
Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117 (1996); see 
also infra text accompanying notes I 86-212 ( discussing cases). 
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plicitly content-based restriction on speech. The Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated different standards for evaluating laws that involve content-
based restrictions as compared to those that involve content-neutral re-
strictions. The most suspect type of content-based restrictions entails 
restriction of speech based on the view it expresses, or viewpoint dis-
crimination. Consider, for example, Kingsley International Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York. 174 A state licensing law 
prohibited the showing of films that involved the positive portrayal of 
"acts of sexual immorality." On this basis, the state withheld a license 
from the film "Lady Chatterley 's Lover," which intimated that adultery 
may be morally permissible under some circumstances. The Supreme 
Court overturned the law because it prohibited speech on the basis of 
viewpoint; the "very heart" of the First Amendment is that its protection 
is not "confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared 
by a majority." 175 
The prohibition on content-based discrimination, reaffirmed in 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 176 can be understood as justifying the protection 
of anonymous speech. If anonymous speech is not protected, then people 
who hold unpopular opinions on matters of controversy will, in some 
cases, withhold their expression of these opinions. By contrast, people 
who hold popular opinions will not similarly withhold their speech. As a 
result, the expression of unpopular viewpoints will be restricted in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. 
Protections for anonymous speech can also be linked with the right 
to privacy. In a line of cases from Griswold v. Connecticut177 to Roe v. 
Wade, 178 the Court has articulated a right to privacy-a right to freedom 
from state interference in certain aspects of one 's life. If the First 
Amendment protects the right to speak publicly and to participate in dis-
cussions of matters of political concern, the right to privacy protects 
one's right to speak without undermining her privacy. If the central goal 
of the First Amendment is robust public debate, the state should remove 
barriers from active participation. The requirement that a person give up 
a significant portion of her privacy in order to speak will reduce the 
scope of debate by decreasing the likelihood that certain people will par-
ticipate in public discussions. 
Anonymous speech can be similarly defended with respect to alter-
native justifications of the right to free speech. The expression of un-
174 360 U.S. 684 ( 1959). 
175 /d. at 688-89. 
176 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see infra text accompanying notes 252-254. 
177 381 U.S . 479 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy includes the right of married 
couples to purchase contraceptives). 
178 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy includes a woman's right to 
an abortion). 
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popular views is important to attaining truth in science179 and philoso-
phy180 as well as politics. If free speech is crucial to the quest for truth in 
the "market place of ideas," 181 then anonymous speech is worthy of pro-
tection because it ensures the expression of multiple viewpoints. 
2. Arguments Against Protecting Anonymous Speech 
There are, however, various arguments against protecting anony-
mous speech. One particularly strong argument made by commentators 
and judges is that anonymity undermines accountability, 182 which pre-
vents crime and ensures responsible contributions to public debate. An 
anonymous speaker faces no consequences for speaking carelessly, cal-
lously, or even criminally. With respect to accountability, there are two 
potential repercussions of anonymity that are cause for concern: first, that 
anonymity will lead to crime; and second, that anonymity will undermine 
free speech rather than advance it. I consider these possibilities in turn. 
In Plato's Republic, while discussing what makes a person just, Soc-
rates relates the tale of a ring that enabled its wearer to become invisible 
on demand. 183 Gyges used this ring, the story goes, to seduce the queen, 
kill the king, and usurp his power. The power of invisibility brought out 
the true nature of Gyges: in the absence of accountability, Gyges' true . 
and unjust nature was expressed. Unfortunately, anonymity carries a 
similar potential for abuse. A truly anonymous speaker can libel, slander, 
and defame at will. Once the state grants a broad right to anonymity, 
there is little it can do to prevent people from abusing the power of 
anonymous speech. The resulting possibility of harmful or even criminal 
speech is a strong argument against protecting anonymity. 
Anonymity will also, say its critics, undermine rather than improve 
public debate on important issues. A person who contributes to public 
debate anonymously lacks accountability and therefore reliabi.lity. With-
out knowing who a speaker is, what her biases are, or where her expertise 
lies, the audience cannot evaluate the speaker's contributions to public 
debate. As a result, anonymity creates a greater potential for deception 
179 PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (Verso 1988) (1975) (arguing that the best 
strategy for science is "anything goes"). 
ISO BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (1965) (arguing that philoso-
phy tries to "overthrow the tyranny of custom" and that doing so involves considering a 
wide range of viewpoints, even the most unpopular). 
181 E.g., Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure, 
and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961) . 
182 See, e.g., Mark Whitt, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n: "A Whole New Bou-
tique of Wonderful First Amendment Litigation Opens Its Doors," 29 AKRON L. REV. 423 
(1996); Note, Bans on Anonymous Political Leajletting, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 180-90 
(1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 193-195 and 203-207 (discussing dissent-
ing opinions). 
183 Plato, Republic, (Paul Shorey trans.) in 2 COLLECTED DIALOGUES 607 (Edith Ham-
ilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1982). 
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and frivolity in public debate. Relatedly, the possibility of anonymous 
contributions to public debate may lead more people to feel the need to 
be anonymous. In other words, anonymity breeds more anonymity. 
Critics of anonymity might also argue that it is possible to protect 
unpopular minorities without granting general protections for anonymity. 
The state permits and/or provides anonymity when it is necessary to do 
so. Examples include the occasional practice of masking speakers' iden-
tity on television news and talk shows as well as the witness protection 
program. These exceptions suggest that anonymity can be selectively 
provided to people who truly need it in order to safely contribute to pub-
lic discussion. 184 
Finally, anonymity undermines the role that free speech plays in 
contributing to individual speakers ' autonomy and sense of self. A person 
who can only comfortably contribute to public debate by speaking 
anonymously presumably feels unsafe in relation to society at large. 
There seems to be intrinsic value to speaking openly for and as oneself. 
Speaking through the veil of anonymity undermines the role of speech in 
identity-formation and in one's sense of involvement in a democratic 
community. 
3. Responses to Arguments Against Anonymity 
Few would argue that the protection of anonymous speech should be 
absolute. A person who commits a crime under the cloak of anonymity 
may thereby surrender her claim to anonymity. The state is thus entitled 
to try to identify and punish those who use anonymity to commit a crime. 
In general, it is possible to strike a workable balance between the need 
for anonymity and the prevention of crime. 
Further, anonymity does not in fact undermine public discourse. 
People involved in public debate ultimately have to evaluate claims and 
arguments independently of the people who made them. In evaluating 
claims, a reader can check the facts , ponder and discuss the arguments, 
and turn to people she knows for help. As a New York state court cau-
tioned in a 1978 case involving anonymous political speech: 
Don' t underestimate the common man. People are intelligent 
enough to evaluate the source of anonymous writing. They can 
see it is anonymous .... They can evaluate its anonymity along 
with its message .... [O]nce they have done so, it is for them to 
' 84 For further elaboration of this argument against the need for general protections for 
anonymity, see the discussion of Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 
U.S. 87 (1982), infra text accompanying note 221. 
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decide what is responsible, what is valuable and what is the 
truth.185 
195 
Finally, if the power to determine who "needs" to be anonymous re-
sides with the state (as it does with the witness protection program), peo-
ple will be less likely to express views that are critical of the state. To 
receive a grant of anonymity from the state, a person would have to re-
veal herself to the state bureaucracy. Sometimes, however, the state itself 
may be the source of a person's need to remain anonymous. For anonym-
ity to empower people with unpopular views to speak, the decision to be 
anonymous should reside in those people, not in the state. 
B. Supreme Court Doctrine 
Three Supreme Court cases have held that the First Amendment 
guarantee of free speech includes strong protection for anonymous 
speech, relying, in part, on the theoretical arguments in favor of protect-
ing anonymous speech. 186 Talley v. California concerned a Los Angeles 
municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of anonymous hand-
bills.187 Los Angeles justified its ordinance by claiming that it legiti-
mately aimed at preventing fraud, libel and false advertising. Justice 
Black, writing for a six-Justice majority, overturned the ordinance, argu-
ing that the requirement that the author of a distributed handbill must be 
identified on the handbill "would tend to restrict ... freedom of expres-
sion"188 and finding the ordinance to be broader than necessary to fulfill 
its legitimate aims. 189 Further, the Court observed that anonymity is often 
used for the "most constructive purposes," 190 not simply for the nefarious 
purposes that Los Angeles sought to prevent. The Court noted that 
"[p ]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have 
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously 
or not at all." 191 The Court offered the examples of religious minorities in 
England and the Founding Fathers who authored The Federalist Papers; 
185 People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (quoted by McIntyre v. 
Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.ll (1995)), aff'd, 354 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1974). 
186 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio 
Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Most 
recently, the Court reaffirmed McIntyre and Buckley in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society 
of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002). 
187 The Los Angeles ordinance at issue provided, "No person shall distribute any hand-
bill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or the 
face thereof, the name and address" of the people who wrote (or printed) and distributed 
the handbill . Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE§ 28.01 (1960)). 
188 Id. at 64. 
189 Id. at 65 . 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 64. 
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in both cases, people wrote anonymously or pseudonymously with posi-
tive results. 192 The Talley Court relied in particular on the idea that ano-
nymity protects unpopular minorities and the benefits of free speech to a 
democracy. 
Justice Clark, writing for the dissent, argued that "the Constitution 
say[s] nothing about the freedom of anonymous speech." 193 The ordi-
nance at issue in Talley, he said, had the legitimate purpose of preventing 
fraud, libel, and other crimes. The ordinance, according to the dissent, 
was constitutionally legitimate in that it only requires a person "who ex-
ercises his right to free speech through writing or distributing handbills 
[to] identify himself just as does one who speaks from the platform." 194 
The dissent argued that Talley had made no showing that he would have 
suffered any injury or restraint on his freedom of speech if he had fol-
lowed the ordinance by identifying himself on the handbill. 195 The dissent 
would have allowed the ordinance to stand because it had a legitimate 
purpose, it in no way infringed upon a constitutionally protected right, 
and, as applied, it did not cause any harm to the plaintiff. The Talley dis-
sent thus appealed to the importance of accountability and emphasized 
that anonymity should be granted only when necessary. 
In McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, the Court reaffirmed Tal-
ley.196 McIntyre concerned an Ohio law against anonymous election 
leaflets. 197 Justice Stevens, writing for a six-Justice majority (Justice 
Thomas concurred only in the judgment), 198 argued that the prohibition 
on anonymous leaflets is a direct and impermissible regulation of the 
content of speech. Anonymity is a rhetorical tool for a writer; a writer's 
decision to make use of this tool by remaining anonymous is protected by 
the First Amendment. 199 The identity of the speaker is a part of a text's 
content, and prohibiting anonymity is therefore a constitutionally imper-
missible restriction on content. Further, advocates of unpopular causes 
are in particularly precarious situations; as a result, their viewpoints are 
especially burdened by laws restricting anonymous speech.200 Anonymity, 
192 Id. at 65. 
193 Id. at 70 (Clark, J. dissenting). 
194 Id. at 71 (Clark, J. dissenting). 
195 Id. at 69 (Clark, J. dissenting). 
196 McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm' n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) . 
197 The Ohio statute at issue, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1994) 
(amended and recodified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517 .20 (West Supp. 2002)), prohib-
its the writing, printing, posting or distribution of material designed to influence an elec-
tion "unless there appears on such form or publication . .. the name and residence of [an 
officer] ... of the organization ... or the person who issues" the material. 
198 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
the Ohio statute should be overturned because the drafters of the First Amendment clearly 
believed that the right to publish anonymous political writings was included under the 
freedom of press). 
199 Id. at 342. 
200 Id. at 345 n.8 . 
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Stevens forcefully concluded, "is a shield from the tyranny of the major-
ity."201 Without the possibility of speaking anonymously, unpopular view-
points may be silenced. Protecting anonymity thereby "exemplifies the 
purpose behind ... the First Amendment; ... to protect unpopular indi-
viduals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand 
of an intolerant society."202 The McIntyre Court thus emphasized the im-
portance of protecting anonymous speech for preserving content-
neutrality in laws regulating speech. 
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, echoed 
· Clark's dissent in Talley. Scalia argued that there is no "right-to-be-
unknown while engaging in electoral politics"203 and no general right to 
anonymity.204 According to Scalia, the majority's opinion creates a new 
right that is unclear, vague, and leads to "silliness."205 The Ohio law, 
Scalia argued, served several important purposes: it promoted truthful-
ness in campaign literature, encouraged civility in campaigns, and en-
sured accountability.206 Although Scalia allowed that anonymity is re-
quired by the First Amendment when needed to "avoid threats, harass-
ment, or reprisals,"207 he argued that the general right to anonymity cre-
ated by the majority in McIntyre is too broad with respect to this purpose. 
Both Talley and McIntyre involved rather narrow statutes. Neverthe-
less, in each the majority defended anonymous speech by appealing to 
general arguments in favor of the right to anonymous speech and an-
swered the dissenting Justices in part with theoretical arguments for pro-
tecting anonymous speech. Given the present composition of the Court, 
as well as the Court's commitment to stare decisis, it seems unlikely that 
McIntyre will be overturned or that the protections afforded anonymous 
speech will be weakened in the near future. 
This prediction is supported by the recent case of Buckley v. Ameri-
can Constitutional Law Foundation,2°8 in which all nine Justices 
reaffirmed the importance of anonymous speech. At issue in Buckley 
were various restrictions on the process for adding voter initiatives to the 
Colorado ballot. Among the restrictions was a requirement that a person 
circulating a petition to get an initiative on the ballot must wear a badge 
stating her name, status as "volunteer" or "paid," and, if paid, the name 
and telephone number of her employer.209 The five-Justice majority com-
pared Colorado's badge requirement to the ordinance at issue in McIntyre 
and found that the 
201 Id. at 357. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
204 Id. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
205 Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
206 Id. at 382-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2m Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
208 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
209 COLO. REV. STAT.§ 1-40-112(2) (2002). 
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restraint on speech ... [involved in the badge requirement] is 
more severe [than that involved in McIntyre because p]etition 
circulation is [a] less fleeting encounter [in that] the circulator 
must endeavor to persuade electors to sign the petition . ... The 
injury to speech is heightened for the petition circulator because 
the badge requirement compels personal name identification at 
the precise moment when the circulator's interest in anonymity 
is greatest. 210 
Although the remaining four Justices disagreed with some aspects of the 
majority's reasoning concerning other elements of the Colorado statutes, 
Justice O'Connor Uoined by Justice Breyer), Justice Thomas, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, in separate opinions, concurred with the majority's 
evaluation of the Colorado badge requirement. Although sharply divided 
on other issues, the Court was unanimous in finding that the Colorado 
badge requirement was unconstitutional because of its requirement that 
circulators display their names.211 
While the protection for anonymous speech that emerges from Tal-
ley, McIntyre, and Buckley prevents the state from requiring an individual 
to identify herself when speaking in public, the protection of anonymous 
speech is not absolute. For example, the Court has suggested that it is 
consistent with free speech to require a corporation engaged in political 
speech to identify itself. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the 
Court held, "Identification of the source of [corporate] advertising may 
be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to 
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected."21 2 Bellotti 
suggests that protections of anonymous speech do not extend to commer-
cial speech. The Supreme Court has not, however, reached the question 
of the extent to which the protection of anonymous speech extends to 
non-political speech. 
C. Conclusion 
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence clearly protects anonymous 
political speech under the First Amendment. To determine whether or not 
a law is consistent with free speech, the Court will look, in part, to 
210 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999). 
21 1 Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
("Requiring petition circulators to reveal their names while circulating a petition directly 
regulates the core political speech of petition circulation."); id. at 212 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 232 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing McIntyre) . 
212 First Nat' ! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S . 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (overturning a 
Massachusetts state law prohibiting corporations from making contributions to influence 
the vote on ballot questions that do not "materially affect" the corporation on the grounds 
that doing so would "abridge[ ] expression that the First Amendment was meant to pro-
tect.") . 
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whether and how such a law protects anonymous speech. In so doing, the 
Court will examine the theoretical arguments for protecting anonymous 
speech, especially those relating to the anonymous speech of unpopular 
minorities or of those with unpopular views whose speech might expose 
them to harm. In light of the social situation of lesbians and gay men and 
the saliency of the closet to that situation, lesbians and gay men qualify 
as the sort of unpopular minorities whose speech deserves the protections 
anonymity affords. The Parts that follow develop this line of thought in 
the context of cyberspace. Given the relative anonymity of speech in cy-
berspace and the role that such speech plays for gay men and lesbians, 
laws that restrict speech in cyberspace should be carefully examined for 
their effect on the speech of sexual minorities. 
VI. CLOSETSPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In this Part, I argue that the right to conceal one's sexual orientation 
in order to fully participate in public discourse is central to lesbians and 
gay men's ability to fully exercise their right to free speech. Put some-
what differently, gay men and lesbians cannot enjoy free speech unless, 
when they speak as gay men or lesbians, they are allowed to speak 
anonymously, either by using a pseudonym or by hiding their identities in 
some other fashion . As a shorthand, I use the term closetspeech for the 
speech of lesbians and gay men, when they speak as lesbians and gay 
men but do so anonymously.2 13 I argue in the following Part that, al-
though the protections properly afforded closetspeech are not absolute, 
the social and legal reality of the closet, the First Amendment protections 
of anonymous speech, and the right to association demonstrate that 
closetspeech is at the core of the First Amendment. Attempts to restrict 
closetspeech should thus be subject to heightened scrutiny. 
A. Closetspeech as Anonymous Speech 
Starting in 1990 and continuing for a couple of years thereafter, a 
leaflet titled "Queers Read This" was distributed at lesbian and gay 
marches and in lesbian and gay venues. 2 14 The flyer indicated that it was 
written and published "anonymously by queers." The leaflet said, in part, 
How can I tell you[?] How can I convince you, brother, sister, 
that your life is in danger[?] That everyday you wake up alive, 
relatively happy, and a functioning human being, you are com-
213 Kang, supra note 8, refers to a similar phenomenon in cyberspace pertaining to race 
as "cyber-passing." 
214 Anonymous, Queers Read This: I Hate Straights (1990), reprinted in WE ARE EVE-
RYWHERE: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS 773 (Mark Blasius 
& Shane Phelan eds., 1997). 
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mitting a rebellious act. You as an alive and functioning queer 
are a revolutionary. There is nothing on this planet that vali-
dates, protects or encourages your existence. It is a miracle that 
you are standing here reading these words. You should by all 
rights be dead .... 
Straight people are your enemy. They are your enemy when they 
don't acknowledge your invisibility and continue to live in and 
contribute to a culture that kills you .. .. 
I hate Jesse Helms. I hate Jesse Helms so much I'd rejoice if he 
dropped down dead. If someone killed him I'd consider it his 
own fault. I hate Ronald Reagan too, because he mass-murdered 
my people for eight years .... I hate him for making a mockery 
of our grief. I hate the fucking Pope ... and I hate the whole 
fucking Catholic Church .... 215 
Despite its wide public distribution and its frequent use of "dirty 
words" and provocative speech, to my knowledge, no one was prosecuted 
for the publication or distribution of this anonymous flyer. In light of 
Buckley, McIntyre, Talley, and the discussion in Part V above, this is the 
right result. The people who published and distributed this controversial 
political leaflet had the right to do so anonymously. The discussion of 
anonymous speech in Part V establishes that when sexual minorities 
speak anonymously as lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, their speech is at 
the core of the speech protected by the First Amendment. 
Even the Justices who dissented in McIntyre would accept a more 
limited form of this argument. While the dissenters in McIntyre denied 
that there is a general right to speak anonymously,216 they allowed that a 
person is entitled to speak anonymously if necessary to avoid "threats, 
harassment, or reprisals."217 The McIntyre dissenters seem to have had in 
mind instances like the following. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 required that political candidates and political action committees 
record and make available to the Federal Election Commission the name 
and address of every person who contributes more than ten dollars a year 
to them.218 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that these requirements 
were constitutional because the government's interest in fair elections 
outweighs the possible infringement of the First Amendment rights of the 
parties involved. 219 However, the Court held out the possibility that mi-
2 15 Id. at 773-74, 776. 
216 McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 371 (I 995) (Scalia, J ., dissent-
ing). 
217 Id. at 380 (citations omitted). 
2 18 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. III 1973) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 432 (2000), chang-
ing, among other things, the $10 threshold to $50). 
2 19 424 U.S. 1 (1976) . 
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nority parties might be exempted from these disclosure requirements if 
they could "show ... a reasonable probability that the compelled disclo-
sure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harass-
ment or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties."220 
In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, the Court 
granted just such an exemption. The Court unanimously held that the risk 
of "threats, harassment or reprisals" was serious enough to exempt the 
Socialist Workers Party from disclosing the names of its contributors.22 1 
Although both dissenters in McIntyre (Justices Scalia and Rehnquist) 
also dissented in Romer, they would perhaps acknowledge that in certain 
contexts, for reasons similar to those at play in Socialist Workers, lesbi-
ans and gay men might be subject to "threats, harassment or reprisals" 
for being open about their sexual orientation, for advocating lesbian and 
gay rights, or for engaging in provocative political speech (such as that 
contained in "Queers Read This"). Even the McIntyre dissenters should 
agree that lesbians and gay men are protected by the First Amendment 
when they speak anonymously about matters relating to lesbian and gay 
sexuality. Even if they do not, there remains a majority of the Court 
poised to recognize that closetspeech, as a controversial type of speech 
that is likely to inspire negative reactions, is at the heart of the First 
Amendment. For many lesbians and gay men, especially for lesbians and 
gay men living in the closest-in particular, lesbian and gay youth like 
Emmalyn Rood and Jeffrey, and lesbians and gay men who live in iso-
lated contexts like rural areas or the military-cyberspace is an important 
and perhaps vital context in which to express themselves anonymously. 
B. No Flaunting, "Don 't Ask, Don't Tell," and Similar Rules 
In Part III, I argued that it is a fairly well-entrenched legal fact that 
lesbians and gay men receive greater protection when their sexual orien-
tations are kept private. For example, since the 1970s, judges, legislators, 
and officials of the executive branch have articulated rules that allow 
people to discuss homosexuality generally and/or to be homosexual 
without losing their government jobs. Under such rules, a lesbian or gay 
man is protected so long as he or she does not make his or her sexual ori-
entation public. According to such rules, the government cannot restrict 
the speech of a gay man or lesbian so long as he or she keeps quiet about 
his or her sexual orientation. For example, under the military's policy 
concerning homosexuality, individuals who "don't tell" (and don't en-
gage in "homosexual conduct") will supposedly not be discharged from 
the military on account of their sexual orientations.222 This policy did not 
220 Id. at 74. 
22 1 459 U.S. 87, 101 (1982). 
222 See IO U.S.C. § 654 (2000). 
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develop in a vacuum. It is a well-accepted social maxim that a gay man 
or lesbian who keeps quiet about his or her sexual orientation will face 
fewer problems. 223 Singer lost his job for "flaunting" his homosexuality,224 
Rowland for not keeping her bisexuality to herself,225 and Shahar for 
publicizing her relationship with another woman.226 Perhaps all three 
would have avoided conflict had they remained silent; their speech would 
have been protected so long as they remained in the closet. 
I am not defending the holdings of Singer, Rowland, and Shahar, all 
of which are problematic from both an ethical and an equal protection 
perspective.227 Rather, I am pointing to a thread that runs through a series 
of judicial decisions-the results of which are often hostile to sexual mi-
norities and gay men-namely that lesbians and gay men receive greater 
First Amendment protection when they stay in the closet. This thread 
dovetails with a commonly held ethical intuition that the law should 
leave alone those lesbians and gay men who do not publicize their sexual 
orientations. This notion and the corresponding social intuition are both 
relatively weak, as I shall argue below. 228 They are nevertheless 
sufficiently strong to sustain a free speech right of significance to lesbi-
ans and gay men, namely the protection of closetspeech. 
Simply put, one source for the protection of closetspeech is that over 
the years, society and the state, through the actions of its various 
branches, have created and sustained the closet. The laws, executive or-
ders , and court rulings that created the legal institution of the closet also 
created an obligation to protect people in the closet and their free speech 
rights . For example, the Ninth Circuit in Singer, by conditioning the ex-
tent of Singer's First Amendment protections to whether he kept his ho-
mosexuality discreet or flaunted it,229 intimated that Singer's speech 
would be protected by the First Amendment so long as Singer stayed in 
the closet. To some extent, when the state takes away the free speech 
rights of some homosexuals (those who flaunt their non-heterosexuality), 
it implicitly supports the speech rights of others (those who keep their 
sexual orientation quiet) . 
223 Those who remain closeted are not immune from harm. Insofar as some people 
know one's sexual orientation, one is at risk of being "outed" (that is, of having one's ho-
mosexuality or bisexuality revealed). For a discussion of outing, see GROSS, supra note 87; 
MOHR, supra note 87; John P. Elwood, Outing, Privacy and the First Amendment, 102 
YALE L.J. 747 (1992); see also discussion of Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 
665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), inf ra text accompanying notes 235-238. 
224 Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm' n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. I 976), vacated, 
429 U.S. 1034 (1977). 
225 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. I 984). 
226 Shahar v.Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (en bane). 
227 In fact, in Part VII, infra, I wilJ argue that, in light of the considerations I discuss 
below, some aspects of the holdings of these cases undermine themselves. 
228 See infra Part VII, especialJy text accompanying note 262. 
229 See Singer, 530 F.2d at 249-50. 
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C. The Right to Association 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment as provid-
ing strong protections for the right to free association, especially when 
such association has political and expressive purposes. The Court articu-
lated this right in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson.230 As part of an 
attempt to prevent the NAACP from operating there, Alabama demanded 
the names and addresses of the association's Alabama members. The 
NAACP refused and was fined one hundred thousand dollars (a great deal 
of money in the 1950s). The Supreme Court held that Alabama's request 
for the membership list was unconstitutional because the "compelled dis-
closure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy"231 restrains "the 
freedom to engage in association," "an inseparable aspect of the liberty 
[involved in] ... the freedom of speech."232 Further, the court held that 
compelled disclosure of [the NAACP's] membership is likely to 
affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to 
pursue their collective effort to foster [their] beliefs ... in that it 
may induce members to withdraw from the [NAACP] and dis-
suade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their 
beliefs through their associations. 233 
Similar associational rights are involved in closetspeech. A person 
has a right to be a member of an association that advocates lesbian and 
gay rights, to subscribe to a gay or lesbian magazine, or to otherwise en-
gage in associational activities related to sexual minorities without the 
risk of exposure. If a person's involvement in associational activities re-
lating to her status as a sexual minority or her involvement in the lesbian 
and gay community puts her at risk of exposure or harm, then she will be 
more likely to restrict her involvement in the lesbian and gay community 
and, perhaps, retreat further into the closet. Closetspeech is thus closely 
connected to free association. 
Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits the state from conditioning 
a person's right to speak on making her affiliations or beliefs known. For 
example, in Shelton v. Tucker,234 the Supreme Court held that the state 
could not require teachers to report all of the organizations with which 
they were affiliated because such a requirement would be an extreme and 
unjustified interference with the teacher's associational freedom. The 
Court's holding in Shelton appears to be in tension with the holding of 
Acanfora (which did not cite Shelton, despite its apparent relevance). 
230 357 U.S. 449 (1958) . 
23 1 Id. at 462. 
232 Id. at 460; see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S . 516 (1960). 
233 Patterson , 357 U.S. at 462-63. 
234 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
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Requiring Acanfora to reveal his membership in a gay organization 
seems to violate his First Amendment right to free association. For the 
state to compel a person to come out of the closet similarly violates the 
First Amendment. Just as free association is central to the First Amend-
ment, so too is the protection of closetspeech. 
D. Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. 
Protection of closetspeech, while central to the First Amendment, is 
not without limitations. While the state can neither force an individual to 
come out, nor condition her speech rights on whether she comes out, the 
First Amendment protection of closetspeech does not, generally, reach 
the actions of non-state actors. Consider the case involving the outing of 
Oliver Sipple. 
In 1975, there was an assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford 
during which Oliver Sipple grabbed the arm of the president's would-be 
assailant, preventing Ford from being harmed. Subsequently, Sipple was 
hailed as a hero in the national press. Various articles, including one 
published by the San Francisco Chronicle, suggested that Sipple was gay, 
an implication that came as a surprise to some members of Sipple's fam-
ily (and, some have speculated, prevented Ford from inviting Sipple to 
the White House) . Sipple sued The Chronicle , the reporter who wrote the 
article in The Chronicle, and various others charging a tortious invasion 
of privacy.235 In upholding the trial court's grant of the defendants ' mo-
tion for summary judgment, a California state appeals court identified 
three elements for a tort of invasion of privacy: (a) the facts disclosed 
must be private; (b) the facts must be disclosed in a public fashion ; and 
(c) the facts disclosed must be offensive and objectionabie to a reason-
able person with ordinary sensibilities.236 The court also noted that even a 
tortious invasion of privacy is exempt from liability if the facts published 
are true and newsworthy.237 The court implicitly granted that the facts 
were disclosed in a public fashion and that they were offensive and ob-
jectionable to a reasonable person, but it went on to hold that Sipple's 
homosexuality was already public in that he "spent a lot of time in . .. 
well-known gay sections of San Francisco; that he frequented gay bars 
and other homosexual gatherings in [a variety of] cities; . . . that his 
friendship with . .. [a] prominent gay was well-known ... ; and that his 
homosexual association and name had been reported in gay magazines 
... several times before [the assassination attempt] ."238 Further, the court 
held that Sipple's homosexuality was newsworthy. The court described 
235 See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ ' g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
236 /d. at 667-68. 
237 Id. at 668. 
238 Id. at 669. 
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Sipple as an "involuntary public figure" who, when he became a public 
figure, lost certain privacy protections that he would have had as a private 
citizen. For this reason, the First Amendment protections of Sipple's 
closetspeech did not trump the Chronicle's free press rights. 
E. Conclusion 
The First Amendment protects closetspeech. Given the ways in 
which the legal institution of the closet is created and maintained by the 
state, it is unconstitutional to require lesbians and gay men to come out 
in order to exercise their right to free speech. Accordingly, just as the 
First Amendment protects anonymous speech, it protects the anonymous 
speech of lesbians ~nd gay men. The protection of closetspeech is espe-
cially robust because of the unique social situation of lesbians and gay 
men. In light of the role cyberspace plays for lesbians and gay men-
namely, it provides a context in which to speak freely, without identify-
ing themselves, and without having to be physically present to communicate 
with others-laws that restrict the closetspeech of lesbians and gay men 
in cyberspace warrant careful and critical judicial evaluation. 
VII. COMING OUT AS POLITICAL SPEECH 
Although lesbians, gay men and other sexual minorities are in some 
ways safer and receive greater First Amendment protection when they are 
closeted, increasingly they are coming out of the closet and speaking out 
about issues of public concern. When lesbians and gay men speak outside 
the closet, what happens to their free speech rights? In this Part, I argue 
that when lesbians and gay men speak as open lesbians and gay men-
what I call "outspeech" (partly to emphasize the contrast with closet-
speech)-their speech is political and thus deserving of strong protection 
under the First Amendment. I shall make this argument in two different 
ways. First, I argue that the act of coming out is political speech and thus 
it is at the heart of the First Amendment. Second, I build on the argument 
of Part VI. Given that closetspeech is paradigmatic of the speech that 
deserves the greatest protection of the First Amendment, it would be 
constitutionally impermissible viewpoint- or content-based discrimina-
tion if outspeech, the speech of open lesbians and gay men, were not 
similarly protected. 
A. "The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name" Speaks 
Not more than a hundred years ago, homosexuality was dubbed the 
"love that dare not speak its name."239 Today, whether to celebrate or de-
239 LORD ALFRED DOUGLAS, Two LOVES (1896) quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY 
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ride it, people frequently discuss homosexuality in public forums, on 
television, in court rooms, in legislatures, and in almost every other con-
text. The "love that dare not speak its name" is now unwilling to keep 
quiet. In fact, issues relating to homosexuality are so contentious that 
Justice Scalia said there is a "culture war"240 in this country about homo-
sexuality. Given this trend as well as the social and legal situation of les-
bians and gay men discussed in Part III, coming out-openly identifying 
as a lesbian, gay man, or bisexual-is a form of political speech.241 By 
coming out, one is effectively saying that being lesbian or gay is nothing 
to be ashamed of and, as such, coming out deserves the strongest protec-
tion of the First Amendment. More generally, outspeech-speaking as an 
open lesbian or gay man-is political speech on a topic of great public 
concern. Because outspeech is political speech, any state interference 
with such speech deserves the most exacting scrutiny of the courts. As 
the discussion that follows will demonstrate, courts have held that out-
speech is political speech and thus deserving of the strongest protection 
under the First Amendment. 
In 1980, Aaron Fricke, a high school student in Rhode Island, in-
formed his principal of his desire to bring a same-sex date to the school's 
prom. The principal prohibited Fricke from doing so on the grounds that 
the presence of a same-sex couple would disrupt the prom and create a 
threat of physical harm to the couple and to others. Fricke filed suit in 
federal court. The district court held that Fricke's act of attending the 
prom with another man was a "political statement" and, hence, was pro-
tected as speech under the First Amendment.242 The court held that the 
principal's reasons for not allowing Fricke to bring a same-sex date to the 
prom failed to satisfy the "least restrictive means" prong of the test set 
forth in United States v. O'Brien.243 Further, the court held that the pri-
mary justification given by the principal for restricting Fricke's political 
speech-the threat of a violent or hostile reaction to his speech-is al-
most never an appropriate justification for restricting speech.244 
OF QUOTATIONS 255 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. I 992). 
240 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S . 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J, dissenting). 
24 1 See, e.g. , Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating 
"Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REV. 269 (1995); David Cole 
& William Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of 
Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C .L. L. REV. 319 (1994) ; Janet Halley, 
The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection f or Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Iden-
tity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989); Kenneth Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of 
Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV . 95, 117-20 (1990). 
242 Fricke v. Lynch, 49 I F. Supp. 381 , 385 (D.R.I. 1980). 
243 391 U.S. 367 (I 968) (upholding a statute prohibiting the mutilation or destruction 
of a selective service registration card against a challenge on free speech grounds). 
244 See Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 387 (citing Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) 
(holding that First Amendment protects a peaceful and orderly political demonstration 
even if onlookers become unruly as a result of the demonstration) and Terminiello v. Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting breach of the peace 
infringed First Amendment rights when used to prosecute a person whose speech invited 
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A similar view of the political nature of outspeech was expressed in 
the late 1970s when a group of four individuals and two gay rights or-
ganizations sued Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) under a Califor-
nia state law preventing employers from interfering with the political 
activities of their employees. 245 The California Supreme Court held that 
this law applied to open homosexuals: 
[T]he struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, 
particularly in the field of employment, must be recognized as a 
political activity. Indeed the subject of the rights of homosexu-
als incites heated political debate today .... The aims of the 
struggle for homosexual rights, and the tactics employed, bear a 
close analogy to the continuing struggle for civil rights waged 
by blacks, women, and other minorities. 
A principal barrier to homosexual equality is the common feel-
ing that homosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual 
worker must conceal from his employer and his fellow workers. 
Consequently one important aspect of the struggle for equal 
rights is to induce homosexual individuals to "come out of the 
closet," acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to associate 
with others in working for equal rights. 246 
The court therefore held that PTT's policy of discriminating against what 
the court called "manifest" homosexuals247-namely "open" homosexu-
als, that is, people who "make an issue" of their homosexuality-violated 
California's labor code. 
The courts in Fricke and PTT both accepted that coming out of the 
closet and being out as a lesbian or gay man is political speech. Together, 
these two cases stand for the proposition that outspeech is the sort of 
speech that is at the core of the First Amendment. 248 Outspeech, like 
public dispute and aroused anger)). 
245 The statute states: 
No employer shall make, adopt or enforce any rule, regulation or policy (a) 
[f]orbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in politics 
... [or] (b) [c]ontrolling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political 
activities or affiliations of employees. 
No employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence his em-
ployees through or by means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to 
adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line 
of political action or political activity. 
CAL. LAB. CODE§ 1101-02 (West 1989). 
246 Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979). 
247 Id. at 596. 
248 This view is further supported by a substantial body of legal and philosophical 
scholarship. See, e.g., RICHARD MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND 
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other political speech, is paradigmatic of the type of speech that the First 
Amendment is designed to protect. Any attempt by the state to constrain 
or interfere with outspeech is highly suspect and should be carefully 
scrutinized by courts. 
B. Viewpoint Discrimination 
The Supreme Court has distinguished between content-based and 
content-neutral laws in evaluating the constitutionality of laws that regu-
late speech. A content-based law is one that regulates speech on the basis 
of its subject matter. Such laws are subject to strict scrutiny and are typi-
cally overturned. For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mos-
ley, 249 the Court struck down a Chicago law prohibiting all picketing out-
side of a school except peaceful picketing concerning a labor dispute. 250 
The Court held that the law impermissibly "restrict[ed] expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."251 Simi-
larly, in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, 252 the Court struck down a St. Paul city 
ordinance prohibiting the placement of certain objects and symbols that 
arouse "anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender."253 The Court held that the ordinance was "fa-
cially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech 
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."254 
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws can 
be coupled with the conclusion of Part VI-that laws restricting closet-
speech cut against the central purpose of the First Amendment-to pro-
vide further support for the conclusion that outspeech is paradigmatic of 
the speech protected by the First Amendment. A state prohibition of out-
speech but not closetspeech would be a content-based restriction on 
speech. Such a restriction would, for this reason, deserve strict scrutiny. 
This seemingly straightforward argument is open to three objections. 
First, one might reply that while content-based restrictions on speech are 
often held to be unconstitutional, status-based restrictions on speech are 
sometimes permissible. For example, in Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Washington, the Court held that it was not a content-based 
restriction on speech to withhold tax benefits from any organization that 
LAW (1988); supra note 241. 
249 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
250 The ordinance at issue provides that a person commits disorderly conduct when she 
knowingly "pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or 
secondary school building ... provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful 
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute .... " Id. at 92-93 (quoting CHI., ILL , 
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 193-l(i) (1968)) . 
251 Id. at 95 . 
252 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
253 Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. , LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)) . 
254 Id. at 381. 
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lobbies Congress unless it is a veterans' organization.255 That the restric-
tion applied only to non-veterans' groups was held to be a status-based 
restriction rather than viewpoint-based restriction.256 Using similar logic, 
perhaps the differential treatment between the speech of open lesbians 
and gay men and the speech of closeted lesbians and gay men might be 
seen as status-based rather than content-based. 
This line of argument is not promising. Many instances of content-
based restrictions on speech can be recast as isomorphic status-based 
restrictions on speech. For example, the law in Mosley251 could be recast 
to allow only union members (a status-based regulation) to picket rather 
than to allow picketing concerning labor disputes (a content-based regu-
lation). Such a status-based law would presumably be unconstitutional 
since it has the same effect on speech as the law overturned in Mosley; a 
content-based restriction of speech does not become permissible simply 
because it refers to a speaker's status. Even allowing that the line be-
tween a status-based and a content-based regulation is unclear, a regula-
tion of speech that distinguishes between outspeech and closetspeech is, 
at its roots, based on content, because it distinguishes speech on the basis 
of whether or not the speaker is open about his or her sexual orientation. 
A second criticism of the argument that a state prohibition on out-
speech but not closetspeech would be an impermissible content-based 
restriction appeals to the Supreme Court's decision in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., in which the 
court held that the state could not require the organizers of Boston's St. 
Patrick's Day parade to allow a group identified as lesbian and gay Irish 
people to march in the parade.258 While the parade organizers said they 
were willing to allow lesbians and gay men to march in the parade, they 
were not willing to let them march under a banner identifying them as an 
Irish American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group. 259 The Court held that 
the First Amendment gives the parade organizers the right to control the 
content of their parade as they see fit: they may decide to include only 
those groups and individuals that contribute the particular expressive 
content to the parade that they desire. In Hurley, the Court seems to have 
accepted a content-based distinction, insofar as it found that it was le-
gitimate for the parade organizers to distinguish between gay and lesbian 
marchers who were not identified as gay and lesbian, on the one hand, 
and gay and lesbian marchers who were so identified, on the other. If this 
255 461 U.S. 540 (1983) . 
256 /d. at 548; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) 
(holding that an injunction that restricted the speech of anti-abortion protestors was not a 
viewpoint-based restriction). 
257 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-93 (1972) . 
258 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S . 557, 
566 (1995) . 
259 Id. at 572. 
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distinction is legitimate in the context of Hurley, perhaps the distinction 
between outspeech and closetspeech is legitimate in other contexts as 
well. 
Hurley can, however, be distinguished on several grounds. First, the 
Court did not address the question of whether the parade organizers were 
state actors (it was accepted that they were not).260 Hurley can therefore 
be distinguished from cases like Singer, Shahar, and Acanfora that 
clearly involve state action. It does not follow from the claim that private 
actors like Hurley and the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, the 
organization he represented, may make a distinction between outspeech 
and closetspeech that a state actor can make such a distinction without 
thereby engaging in impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 
Further, it is not clear to what extent Hurley survives Romer. 261 Con-
sider whether the Court would have ruled differently if parade organizers 
had refused to let a group of African American marchers join the parade. 
Would the fact that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny have 
affected the outcome of such a case? If so, perhaps the Court's acknow-
ledgement in Romer that sometimes classifications based on sexual ori-
entations are impermissible would undermine the holding of Hurley. 
A final criticism of the theory that the First Amendment protects 
outspeech is that this argument both relies on and undermines the logic 
of Singer and similar cases and is thereby an illegitimate form of argu-
ment. Recall, however, that my strategy here is to build on the conclusion 
of Part VI that the First Amendment protects closetspeech. In cases like 
Singer, courts have essentially held that closetspeech is protected but 
outspeech is not. My argument here is that to protect closetspeech but not 
outspeech is an impermissible form of content regulation. I am taking 
one part of the holding of cases like Singer (that closetspeech is pro-
tected) and showing that, in light of other well-established principles of 
First Amendment doctrine (e.g., the rule against content-based regulation 
of speech), another part of the holding of such cases (that outspeech can 
be regulated) is undermined. To borrow a metaphor from Ludwig Witt-
genstein, I am "throw[ing] away the ladder after [I have] climbed up on 
i t."262 
200 Id. at 566. 
261 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free 
Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85 (1998) (arguing that re-
strictions on being openly gay, as in Hurley, are in tension with equality for sexual minori-
ties) . 
262 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS L0GIC0-PHIL0S0PHICUS 189 (C. K. Ogden 
trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1971) (1922) . 
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The preceding Part concluded that the First Amendment protects 
closetspeech and, thus, in light of the role cyberspace plays for lesbians 
and gay men, that the First Amendment strongly protects closetspeech in 
cyberspace. A parallel conclusion follows. The First Amendment protects 
outspeech by virtue of its political character. Laws that constrain out-
speech are subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. In light 
of the role that cyberspace plays for lesbians and gay men, attempts to 
restrict outspeech in cyberspace should also be strictly scrutinized. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In Part V, I argued that anonymous speech, especially anonymous 
speech on matters of public controversy, is paradigmatic of the speech at 
the heart of the First Amendment. The same arguments apply in cyber-
space. If a present-day McIntyre decided to post on a Web site her mate-
rial arguing against a referendum on a school tax or to send electronic 
mail to her neighbors encouraging them to vote on a referendum, her 
"cyber-pamphleteering" would deserve the same sort of First Amendment 
protection as the traditional pamphleteering at issue in McIntyre. The 
protections afforded anonymous speech extend to cyberspace.263 Further, 
the especially strong protection afforded the anonymous speech of un-
popular minorities should be extended to the speech of lesbians and gay 
men in cyberspace. 
As an illustration, consider the rest of Timothy McVeigh's story. 
After he discovered that AOL had illegally released his name to the 
Navy, McVeigh sent e-mail messages to every AOL user with the word 
"gay" in his or her member profile. In his e-mail message, McVeigh told 
the story of how AOL mistreated him. As news of what happened to 
McVeigh spread, many AOL users and others wrote to AOL, the White 
House, the Pentagon, and Congress. The dramatic response to McVeigh's 
"mass" e-mail encouraged him to sue the Navy and ensured that his case 
would receive widespread media attention. It also forced AOL to clarify 
its policy with respect to the privacy of its customers.264 
McVeigh's cyber-activism is a vivid example of the role cyberspace 
can play in the organization of political and social change in the lesbian 
and gay community. McVeigh's cyber-activism would not have been as 
effective as it was (if it would have occurred at all) if lesbians and gay 
men did not have the opportunity to communicate anonymously that cy-
berspace affords them. Specifically, without the capability to anony-
mously identify as "gay" or "lesbian" in their AOL profiles, far fewer 
263 See, e.g., Branscomb, supra note 173; Tien, supra note 173, at 121. 
264 Steve Friess, supra note 14. 
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people would list their sexual orientations in such a manner. If they did 
not self-identify in this way, the type of cyber-activism in which 
McVeigh engaged would have been much less effective, or even impossi-
ble. 
That the speech in cyberspace of lesbians, gay men, and other sexual 
minorities deserves strong protection does not entail that the First 
Amendment protects all anonymous speech in cyberspace, any more than 
it protects all anonymous speech outside of cyberspace. In fact, given the 
growth of computer viruses265 and cyberstalking, 266 one might argue that 
the dangers of anonymous speech in cyberspace are greater than the dan-
gers of anonymous speech in other contexts. Accountability is needed to 
prevent speakers in cyberspace from sending destructive viruses to other 
users , and anonymity does undermine such accountability. However, this 
reality fails to undermine the argument for anonymity in cyberspace. 
Computer crimes can be deterred and punished without prohibiting ano-
nymity in cyberspace. Anonymity in cyberspace deserves at least as 
much protection as anonymity in the physical (that is, non-cyberspace) 
world. 
Further, because of the special role that cyberspace plays for lesbi-
ans and gay men, attempts to regulate cyberspace by preventing anonym-
ity will have a differential impact on lesbians and gay men. The argu-
ments of Parts VI and VII entail that, in the current social situation, the 
speech of lesbians and gay men-whether outspeech or closetspeech-is 
at the core of the protections afforded by the First Amendment. Because 
of the closet and other features of their social situation, lesbians and gay 
men have special needs for the sort of anonymity that cyberspace pro-
vides. Like contributors to a small and unpopular political party,267 in 
various contexts lesbians and gay men face "threats, harassment, or repri-
sals"268 when they come out. As such, even judges who are skeptical of 
the right to anonymous speech, like the dissenters in McIntyre , should 
support anonymity for lesbians and gay men in hostile climates; protect-
ing "persecuted groups . . . [who] criticize oppressive practices and 
laws"269 is at the very core of the First Amendment. 
265 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katya! , Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA . L. REV. 
1003, 1023-27 (2001) (defining computer viruses and other types of unauthorized disrup-
tions to computers); Michael Edmund O 'Neill , Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning 
Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV . 237, 252-53 (2000). 
266 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.usdoj .gov/criminal/ 
cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm; Katya!, supra note 265, at 1034-37 (defining cyberstalk-
ing). 
267 See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982). 
268 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (I 995) (Scalia, J ., dissent-
ing). 
269 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). 
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Given the current social situation for lesbians and gay men, cyber-
space provides a unique context for lesbians, gay men and other sexual 
minorities to build community, engage in activism, exchange ideas, make 
friends, and build families. Many lesbians and gay men, especially les-
bian and gay youth like Jeffrey and Emmalyn Rood and lesbians and gay 
men who live in geographically isolated communities or in communities 
where they feel uncomfortable being open about their sexual orientation 
(for example, the military), make extensive use of cyberspace. The ability 
to use cyberspace anonymously is thus especially significant for lesbians 
and gay men. My argument that attempts to restrict closetspeech and out-
speech should be carefully scrutinized is particularly applicable in the 
context of cyberspace. 
The First Amendment, like the Constitution of which it is a part, is a 
living text that must be adapted to situations its drafters could not have 
imagined. Although the Framers could not have anticipated either the 
development of cyberspace or the particular social circumstances faced 
by sexual minorities, their text and the theories that informed it apply to 
both contexts. The speech of lesbians and gay men-and, in particular, 
their anonymous and political speech in cyberspace--deserves the strongest 
protection the First Amendment can provide. When legislatures craft 
statutes designed to regulate cyberspace, they need to consider the unique 
role that cyberspace plays in the lives of many lesbians and gay men. 
When courts evaluate the constitutionality of attempts to regulate cyber-
space, they need, as most courts thus far have done, to protect the free-
dom of speech of sexual minorities. In particular, when courts face les-
bian and gay litigants challenging attempts to regulate speech in cyber-
space-as they so often have and will no doubt continue to do-they 
need to take special cognizance of the virtual lifeline that cyberspace 
provides lesbians and gay men and carefully scrutinize laws that trench 
on their First Amendment rights 
